THE MARKET FOR PRIVATE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION SERVICES – AN
EMPIRICAL RE-ASSESSMENT OF
ICANN-UDRP PERFORMANCE
*

**

Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo
I.
II.

Introduction...........................................................................................2
ICANN-UDRP Characteristics ...........................................................11
A. Procedure and Enforcement ..................................................................13
B. Number of Participants..........................................................................19
C. International Cooperation ......................................................................19
D. User Participation..................................................................................22
III.
UDRP Providers..................................................................................24
A. Characteristics of the Providers.............................................................26
1. Supplemental Rules............................................................................26
2. Fees ....................................................................................................28
3. Geographical Representation of Arbitrators.......................................30
IV.
Empirical Evidence .............................................................................33
V.
Econometric Model.............................................................................36
A. Are Complainants Selecting Providers by Bias or Efficiency? .............37
B. How Important is Efficiency for Analyzing Provider Performance? ....44
C. Results ...................................................................................................47
D. Econometric Results..............................................................................56
E. Duration Analysis by Provider ..............................................................57
1. Panelists across Providers ..................................................................76
2. Default................................................................................................79
3. Type of Panels....................................................................................79
VI.
Results and Policy Implications For Other ADR Initiatives ...............82
VII. Conclusions.........................................................................................86
VIII. Appendix A .........................................................................................88
IX.
Appendix B .........................................................................................89
X.
Appendix C .........................................................................................90
XI.
Appendix D .........................................................................................92

*
Professor & Director, Program in Intellectual Property & Technology Law, University of Illinois College of
Law. Jay Kesan would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Justin Hughes, Mark Lemley, Polk
Wagner and the participants in the 2004 Intellectual Property Scholars’ Conference held at DePaul University
College of Law.
**
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics & Geography, University of North Florida. Andres Gallo
would like to acknowledge the helpful comments received at the Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR)
Conference, University of Sussex, England, September 2004.

I. Introduction
The entities that provide Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR)
services for a specific class of disputes within a defined dispute
resolution framework are often studied by comparing them to the
courts. But there are very few, and no thorough, empirical studies
that compare ADR service providers’ performance and study the
market for private dispute resolution services.
In the past few years, the number of Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) systems has increased dramatically. This is
especially due to the Internet furthering the use of new
communication technologies for providing arbitration services.1
Much the increase in ADR regimes is also a result of the passage of
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, legislation that
promoted and authorized the use of ADR providers in the United
States.2
Generally, ADR regimes function as an alternative to the
courts for resolving different conflicts.3 The range and scope of
activities and issues resolved through ADR is growing fast and
includes diverse fields like labor, health services, e-commerce,
domain names, and similar pursuits.4 As such, there are many

1. “Informal rulemaking, “one of the greatest inventions of modern government”, is about to be
transformed by the silent revolution of e-government, the widespread incorporation of Web-based technology
in the public sector. Whether the revolution is a boon or a bust for democracy will depend on whether that
technology is designed to strengthen the right of citizens to participate in making administrative rules.” Beth
Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 433 (2004).
“Where offline ADR may help to settle a matter in days or months, as compared to the years it may take to
resolved litigation, online ADR promises settlement of disputes within days or even hours. The borderless
nature of the Internet diminishes the communication problems faced by parties located in different time zones”
Aashit Shah, Using ADR to Resolve Online Disputes. 10 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 25, 21 (2004).
2. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 105th Congress, at http://www.usdoj.gov/ crt/adr/pl105315.txt .
3. “The growth of ADR is based on the recognition that there are many ways to resolve disputes,
limited only by the parties creativity and willingness to innovate. Parties involved in disputes, their attorneys,
mediators and arbitrators should continuously investigate, discuss and implement innovative procedures that
will lead to a fair, efficient and effective resolution of disputes.” Robert J. Macpherson, Richard F. Smith and
Roy S. Mitchell, Innovations in Arbitration: Improving the Presentation of Evidence in Constructing
Arbitration, 58-OCT DISP. RES. J. 30, 34 (2003).
4. See, Mitchell Nathanson, It’s the Economy (and Combined Ratio), Stupid: Examining the Medical
Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors Critical to Reform, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1077 (2004);
Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Transformation of American Labor Unions, 69 MO. L. REV. 365;J. (2004);
Clarence Davies, Environmental ADR and Public Participation, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 389 (2000); Phyllis E.
Bernard, Mediating with an 800-pound Gorilla: Medicare and ADR, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1417 (2003);
Michael Z. Green, Opposing Excessive Use of Employer Bargaining Power in Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements Through Collective Employee Actions, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 77 (2003); Ayelet Lichtach,
Inappropriate Use of E-mail and the Internet in the Workplace: The Arbitration Picture, 59 APR DIP. RESOL.
26 (2004); Michael L. Rustad, Punitive Damages in Cyberspace: Where in the World is the Consumer? 7
CHAP. L. REV. 39 (2004); Aashit Shah, supra note 1 (addressing issues concerning ADR in different economic
sectors).
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reasons for why ADR is advantageous as compared with the courts.5
First, ADR is faster than the courts and provides quick relief for a
diverse set of issues.6 Second, ADR tends to have simple procedural
rules that parties can easily understand.7 Third, and closely related
to the other two characteristics, ADR is relatively inexpensive and
provides valuable dispute resolution services for consumers.8 As a
result, there is a proliferation of different ADR providers in many
economic sectors.9
There are, however, many commentators and scholars who
complain about the actual effectiveness of ADR regimes.10 Most of
the critics focus on the lack of certain characteristics in ADR systems
that are key to producing impartial and accurate judgments. First,
the appointment and availability of panelists or arbitrators is limited
and controlled by the ADR provider.11 Second, procedures are
usually private.12 Third, sometimes ADR systems do not provide for
an effective appeal of their rulings.13 Fourth, ADR systems
concentrate on specific types of cases, such as labor issues. Such a
repetition of the same kind of cases, and also the same parties,
creates problems of independence and objective analysis of each
5. See Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of ADR Services by Courts: Critical
Values and Concerns, 10 Ohio ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 715 (1999); Lucille M. Ponte, Boosting Consumer
Confidence in E-Business: Recommendations for Establishing Fair and Effective Dispute Resolution Programs
for B2C Online Transactions, 12 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 441 (2002); Rex R. Perschbacher and Debra Lyn
Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B. U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (analyzing the effectiveness of ADR regimes).
6. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
7. See generally Perschbacher and Bassett, supra note 5.
8. “Alternative dispute resolution methods can mitigate the problem of the high cost of litigation.
Indeed, its ability to reduce dispute resolution costs is generally regarded as one of the chief benefits of ADR.
Because ADR costs less than traditional dispute resolution, it is more accessible for the parties involved.”
Nathan K. DeDino, When Fences Aren’t Enough: The Use Of Alternative Dispute Resolution To Resolve
Disputes Between Neighbors, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 887, 893 (2003).
9. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
10. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
11. “Another, related dimension of the arbitration that should be addressed in the arbitration agreement
is which entity should have controlling authority in the proceeding: the administering arbitral institution, the
arbitrating parties, or the arbitrators. Traditionally, practice provides the basic guidance on this matter
following the rule that “unless the parties provide otherwise, the arbitrators shall decide. . . .” This pragmatic
balance between freedom of contract and the authority of the arbitrators has been, and may continue to be, a
sufficient hierarchy of authority. In circumstances in which irreconcilable positions develop between the three
principal players in the process, however, such as those pertaining to the matter of impartiality, the well-settled
hierarchy may be inadequate to resolve the conflict. Party provisions in these circumstances would at least
emphasize the importance and argue for the controlling authority of contract in the resolution of these
conflicts. Courts may not support, and arbitral institutions may not yield, to that principle of determination.”
Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise Of Contract Freedom In The Making Of Arbitration Agreements, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189, 1217 (2003).
12. See Perschbacher and Bassett supra note 5 (analyzing the differences between arbitration and
courts).
13. “The lack of appeal from arbitration is another way to challenge mandatory reference to binding
arbitration. Since the legal grounds to challenge are very demanding, with a strong presumption in favor of the
arbitrator’s decision, the lack of appeal can appear to be another hindrance to rights enforcement. Arbitrators’
decisions have long been thought to contain compromises of one sort or another.” Bryant G. Garthy, Tilting the
Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 927, at 935 (2002).
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case.
Finally, ADR systems are usually private, and their
stakeholders can have a close relationship with the groups that have
an interest in the services provided by the ADR entities. For
example, in the case of Trust-e, the companies that supported and
created the ADR regime for the protection of online privacy were
also using the same system to enter consumer complaints that needed
resolution.14
Despite the interest in the performance of different ADR
providers, most of the literature concentrates on the analysis of the
main characteristics of these systems as compared to the courts. 15
Nonetheless, within the world of private dispute resolution, we
should naturally observe differences in performance among these
private providers. However, literature has addressed neither the
effects of this competition nor the consistency and uniformity across
ADR providers.
We present a thorough analysis of one of the ADR regimes
that is considered a significant success in Internet markets, the
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) implemented by the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).16
In this work, we perform a complete empirical analysis of the UDRP
and evaluate its performance. We then extrapolate the results to
other sectors of the Internet market and to private dispute resolution
in general.
The impressive growth of the Internet in the 1990s and the
boom of the e-economy generated competition for the most coveted
of the top domain names, i.e., the .com.17 Nonetheless, the other
original generic top level domain names (gTLDs) open to
commercial use, .org and .net, were also in high demand from
businesses.18 Other types of top-level domain names, especially the
14. See Trust-e at http://www.truste.org (showing that most of the sponsors and founders of the Seal are
also users).
15. See supra notes 4 and 5 and accompanying text.
16. This type of ADR regime has also been proposed for other Internet activities such as electronic
commerce, business relationships, and the like.
17. “. . .[T]he ‘Webification’ of domain names was the critical step in the endowment of the name space
with economic value. It massively increased the demand for domain name registrations and game common, or
famous, or generic terms under the .com space the commercially valuable property of being able to effortlessly
deliver thousands if not millions of Web site “hits”.” Milton Mueller, RULING THE ROOT. INTERNET
GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE, The MIT Press Cambridge, 109 (2002).
“The e-commerce explosion of the late 20th Century has created a rush on Internet domain names. More
domain names are being registered, and there are more registrars to do it than ever before. In fact, the Internet
may be running out of space. In the most popular top level domain, <.com>, it seems that almost every
recognizable word has been claimed.” Kevin Heller, The Young Cybersquatter’s Handbook: A Comparative
Analysis of the ICANN Dispute, 2 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 2, 2 (2001).
18. “Other gTLDs in existence since 1984 impose additional criteria for registration: .mil (U.S.
military), .gov (U.S. government), .int (international organizations), .edu (institutions of higher education,
mostly U.S. based), and .arpa. In November 2000, following a complex and convoluted process, ICANN
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country code TLDs (ccTLDS), were of little commercial value, and
registration was not as important as it was with gTLDs.19 As a result,
the artificial scarcity of TLDs created by the managers of the
Domain Name System (DNS) sharply increased the value of the
registered and most popular domain names. Although a new set of
gTLDs were recently introduced in the root system,20 the .com
domain names are still the most important for e-commerce. Initially,
Network Solutions Inc. (NSI), a private for-profit firm, through a
special contract with the United States government, managed the
domain name system.21 Later, in 1995, NSI delineated a policy for
conflict resolution of domain names without creating an authority to
solve disputes.22 The result was that the management of numerical
addresses in the Internet was under the charge of the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).23
In 1997, because of the expansion of the Internet
internationally, the United States government delegated the
approved in principle the creation of seven new gTLDs.” A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy” Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 618 (2002).
“Domain names have become the valuable intangible real estate of cyberspace. For example, the domain name
sex.com was valued at $250 million; business.com at $7.5 million; and loan.com at $3.0 million. The monetary
value of some domain names suggests that it would be proper to classify domain names as property.” XuanThao N. Nguyen, Cyberproperty and Judicial Dissonance: The Trouble with Domain Name Classification, 10
GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, 184-85 (2001).
19. See Froomkin, supra note 17, at 618.
20. “Among the most significant events in the domain name world is the addition of seven new generic
top level domain names (“gtlds”): .aero; .biz; .coop; .info; .museum; .name; and .pro. The .info name like .com
before it, is unrestricted and anyone will be able to register and use it. The other domain names have restricted
uses.” Barbara Solomon, Domain Name Disputes: New Developments and Open Issues, 91 TRADEMARK REP.
833, 833 (2001).
21. “NSI agreed to register second-level domains in .com, .net, .org and .edu and to maintain those toplevel domains’ master databases. These services were underwritten by the National Science Foundation and
were free to users initially. As the number of registrations began to rise, NSI and the National Science
Foundation agreed that NSF would no longer underwrite these services. Instead, NSI would charge a fifty
dollar (US $50) annual fee to each domain name registrant.” Wayde Brooks, Wrestling Over the World Wide
Web: ICANN’s Uniform dispute Resolution Policy for Domain Names Disputes, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
- 312 (2001).
POL’Y 297, 311
22. “In July 1995, Network Solutions issued a “Domain Dispute Resolution Policy Statement” designed
to shield itself from future trademark-related lawsuits. In this policy statement, Network Solutions declared
that it “has neither the legal resources nor the legal obligation to screen requested Domain Names to determine
if the use of a Domain Name by an Applicant may infringe upon the right(s) of a third party.” It then set out a
series of contractual conditions that would be imposed on all registrants in the InterNIC-operated domains. The
policy gave Network Solutions the right to withdraw a domain name from use if presented with a court order
from an arbitration panel decision transferring the name.” MUELLER, supra note 16, at 120-121.
“To invoke the NSI Dispute Policy, the complainant would have to give notice to the registrant that there had
been an alleged trademark violation because the “creation date” of the registrant’s domain name registration
followed the “effective date” of the complainant’s registration of an identical trademark. After NSI received a
copy of the complaint, the registrant would have thirty days to prove that he owned a trademark in the
contested name. If he could not, NSI would put the domain name on “hold” until a resolution was reached,
either between the parties or through litigation.” Keith Blackman, The Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy: A Cheaper Way to Hijack Domain Names and Suppress Critics, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
211, 222 (2001).
23. “RFC 1083 (December 1988), which defined a standards-making process for the new, extended
Internet community, was also the first public document to mention an Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA).” MUELLER, supra note 16, at 93 (describing the creation and characteristics of IANA).
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management of numbers and names on the Internet to a non-profit
corporation based in California, the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).24 From 1997 on, ICANN
was in charge of managing the names and numbers system for the
Internet.25 Even though ICANN is the most important organization
managing domain names, it is not the only one. There are other
alternative root servers: Open NIC, ORSC, Pacific Root, New.net,
Name.space, and CN-NIC. 26 The relevance and power of ICANN to
implement new policies for the Internet is based on two main
characteristics: (1) the monopoly of the main Domain Name system
in the Internet; and (2) the lack of technological compatibility
between competing Domain Name systems, preventing other private
firms from competing with ICANN.27
One of the main problems in the medium term was the
creation of a system to handle the growing number of conflicts
among users caused by the sometimes indiscriminate registration of
domain names that collided with already established trademarks in
the real life markets.28 These disputes grew in direct proportion to
the increase in Internet commerce in the late 1990s.29 In fact, instead
24. See MUELLER, supra note 16, Chapter 8 (describing the political process that resulted in the creation
of ICANN in 1997).
“In the White Paper that emerged from the convoluted U.S. government policy process –formally known as the
U.S. Department of Commerce’s Statement of Policy on Management of Internet Names and Addresses- the
government took something of a middle-of-the-road position. It agreed that trademark owners were being
victimized by so-called cyberpirates who registered domain names to sell them to the corresponding trademark
holder. But rather than proposing direct action, the White Paper called on WIPO to conduct a study and make
recommendations for what would become ICANN.” Froomkin, supra note 17, at 622-623.
25. “In furtherance of the foregoing purposes, and in recognition of the fact that the Internet is an
international network of networks, owned by no single nation, individual or organization, the Corporation
shall, except as limited by Article 5 hereof, pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burdens
of government and promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet by
(i)coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on
the Internet; (ii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet Protocol (“IP”)
address space; (iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet domain
name system (“DNS”), including the development of policies for determining the circumstances under which
new top-level domains are added to the DNS root system; (iv) overseeing operation of the authoritative
Internet DNS root server system; and (v) engaging in any other related lawful activity in furtherance of items
(i) through (iv).” Articles of Incorporation of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers,
November 1998, at http://www.icann.org/general/articles.htm
26. See MUELLER, supra note 16 at 55 (describing the other root servers of the Internet and the problems
of compatibility between them).
27. Id.
28. “Unfortunately for these businesses, registration of SLDs in the three existent gTLDs (.com, .org
and .net) and in the ccTLDs which emulate them, is on a first-come, first-served basis. No questions are asked
about the proposed use, or about possible trademark conflicts. . . . As there was no limit to the number of
names a person could register, name speculators quickly understood that they could register names and seek
buyers for them without risking any capital. While some speculators sought common words with multiple
possible uses, a few others –who became known as cybersquatters- registered thousands of names that
corresponded to the trademarks or companies that had not yet found the Internet and then sought to resell (or,
some would say, ransom) the name to those companies.” Froomkin, supra note 17, at 620.
29. “Whether the actual magnitude of the overall “cyber-piracy” problem was .045% or 3.5% of new
registrations, or more likely somewhere in between, and whether the problem was growing or shrinking, in
absolute terms, it clearly existed.” Froomkin, supra note 17, at 627.
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of decreasing the pressure on the use of the .com by creating other
kinds of top domain names, ICANN allegedly created an artificial
scarcity in this environment and drove up the demand for use of the
already fully utilized .com.30 The usual mechanism to solve these
kinds of disputes, court, had difficulty handling cases where parties
came from different jurisdictions and had different rights under the
law. And even though the courts reached verdicts, the enforcement
of those verdicts was typically weak, if at all.31 Furthermore, typical
judicial remedies were too slow and expensive to adequately resolve
Internet domain name disputes.32
One of the main tasks of ICANN, in accordance with the
mandate received through the delegation of power from the United
States government, was to provide a fast and inexpensive system to
solve domain name disputes.33
In 1999, after a series of
consultations with many interest groups, ICANN created the

30. See Heller, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Even though there were just three gTLDs open to general public, IANA registered more than 200 applications
until 1996. See MUELLER, supra note 16, at 132-133.
31. “The global reach of the Internet provides both the Internet’s appeal and many of the legal problems
being encountered. Activity on the web that may be permissible where initiated may violate the law in the
locale where the web site is accessed. Until recently there was no easy way to confine modifications to a web
site or domain name to a particular geographic area. Thus, any changes that were made or imposed by a court
became global in effect even when made in response to local laws or requirements.” Solomon, supra note 19,
at 859.
“Many of these multijurisdictional disputes raise exactly the kinds of issues typically found in U.S. litigation
involving citizens of more than one state, such as differences in substantive law, procedural rules, and choice
of law rules. As the disputes move from interstate to international, the differences and practical difficulties
increase. Difference in substantial law may be more substantial, differences in procedural rules more
significant, differences in the ability to acquire jurisdiction more diverse, and differences in choice of law rules
more complex. Also, multinational disputes can add a layer of enforcement difficulties.” Elizabeth Thornburg,
Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution Process, 6 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 191, 192-193 (2002).
See Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L REV. 1275 (2002) (analyzing the
problems of the courts in handling cases related to the Internet).
32. “Notwithstanding the size of the individual settlements, firms managing large number of brands
argued that the cumulative costs imposed an unfair burden and amounted to a windfall to the undeserving.
Worse, aggrieved trademark holders in countries with dysfunctional court systems stated that their national
court systems were so slow as to make the wait for meaningful relief against improper domain name
registrations an eternity in Internet time, or even in ordinary time. Other trademark holders complained of the
difficulty of locating cybersquatters who falsified their contact information at the time of registration, or who
were located in jurisdictions where the law was uncertain, the courts unreliable, or service was difficult.”
Froomkin, supra note 17, at 629.
33. “The U.S. Government will seek international support to call upon the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) to initiate a balanced and transparent process, which includes the participation of
trademark holders and members of the Internet community who are not trademark holders, to (1) develop
recommendations for a uniform approach to resolving trademark/domain name disputes involving cyberpiracy
(as opposed to conflicts between trademark holders with legitimate competing rights), (2) recommend a
process for protecting famous trademarks in the generic top level domains, and (3) evaluate the effects, based
on studies conducted by independent organizations, such as the National Research Council of the National
Academy of Sciences, of adding new gTLDs and related dispute resolution procedures on trademark and
intellectual property holders. These findings and recommendations could be submitted to the board of the new
corporation for its consideration in conjunction with its development of registry and registrar policy and the
creation and introduction of new gTLDs.” United States Department of Commerce, Management of Internet
Names and Addresses, June 1998, at http://www.icann.org/general/white-paper-05jun98.htm
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Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).34 The UDRP was a
decentralized regime for dispute resolution in which ICANN created
the general rules and authorized a series of competing private
providers to manage and resolve disputes. ICANN, because of its
role as the only manager of the domain name system, almost
perfected enforcement of the providers’ decisions.35 Nonetheless,
after a few years, scholars and commentators harshly criticized
ICANN. Overall, the debate on the performance of the system has
been strong, with both favorable and unfavorable comments.36
34. “The UDRP was adopted to provide a relatively fast and effective means of dealing with the issues
of bad faith domain name registration. Currently, the UDRP applies to the .com, .net, and .org gtlds and top
sixteen cctlds. Moreover, there is a push for all cctld registrars to adopt a policy modeled on the UDRP. If all
domain registrars were to adopt the same policy, a complainant could bring a consolidated action concerning
objectionable domain names in both gtlds and cctlds. WIPO has received four such cases.” Solomon, supra
note 19, at 835.
35. “Under the UDRP, jurisdiction is contractual. The UDRP is incorporated into every domain name
Registration Agreement. By registering a domain name with any accredited registrar, if any third party alleges
cybersquatting, respondent subjects himself to the UDRP’s mandatory administrative procedure which is in
procedural compliance with the Rules.” Heller, supra note 16, at 4.
36. There is a wide range of critics and some support of the UDRP by ICANN. The following is an
incomplete list of some papers that deal with the problems and challenges of the system: Laurence R. Helfer
and Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 141, 154-155 (2001); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Fast,
Cheap and Out of Control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution Process, 6 J. Small & Emerging Bus.
L. 191 (2002); Patrick D. Kelley, Emerging Patterns in Arbitration Under the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, 17 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 181 (2002); Adam Goldstein, ICANNSUCKS.BIZ (And Why You
Can’t Say That): How Fair Use of Trademarks in Domain Names is Being Restrained, 12 Fordham Intell.
Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 1151 (2002); Milton Mueller, A New Profile of Domain Name Trademark Disputes
under ICANN’s UDRP, Syracuse University School of Information Studies Working Paper, June 2002 (On
file with the authors); Milton Mueller, supra note 16; Scott Hejny, Opening the Door to Controversy: How
Recent ICANN Decisions Have Muddied the Waters of Domain Name Dispute Resolution, 38 Hous. L. Rev.
1037 (2001); Keith Blackman, The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy: A Cheaper Way to
Hijack Domain Names and Suppress Critics, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 211 (2001); Pamela Segal, Attempts to
Solve the UDRP’s Trademark Holder Bias: A Problem That Remains Unsolved Despite the Introduction of
New Top Level Domain Names, 3 Cardozo Online J. Conflict Resol. 1 (2001); Holger P. Hestermeyer, The
Invalidity of ICANN’s UDRP Under National Law, 3 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 1 (2002); Michael Geist,
Fair.com? An Examination of the allegations of systemic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 Brook. J. Int’l
L. 903 (2002); Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and
the Constitution, 50 Duke L. J. 17 (2000); Joe Sims and Cynthia Bauerly, A Response to Professor Froomkin:
Why ICANN Does Not Violate The APA or The Constitution, 6 J. Small & emerging Bus. L. 65 (2002);
Michael Froomkin, Form and Substance in Cyberspace, 6 J. Small & emerging Bus. L. 93 (2002); Joe Sims
and Cynthia L. Bauerly, A Reply to Professor Froomkin’s Form and Substance in Cyberspace, 6 J. Small &
emerging Bus. L. 125 (2002); Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy” –Causes
and (Partial) Cures 67 Brook. L. Rev. 605 (2002); David H. Bernstein, The Alphabet Soup of domain Name
Dispute Resolution: The UDRP and ACPA, 716 PLI/Pat 251 (2002); Richard E. Speidel, ICANN Domain
Name Dispute Resolution, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, and the Limitations of Modern Arbitration
Law, 6 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 167 (2002); Stephen J. Ware, Domain Name Arbitration in the
Arbitration-Law Context: Consent to, and Fairness in, the UDRP, 6 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 129 (2002);
Joe Sims and Cynthia Bauerly, A Response to Professor Froomkin: Why ICANN Does Not Violate the APA
or the Constitution, 6 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 65 (2002); Jeffrey J. Look, Law and Order on the Wild,
Wild West (WWW), 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 817 (2002); David E. Sorkin, Judicial Review of ICANN
Domain Name Dispute Decisions, 18 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 35 (2001); Lisa M. Sharrock,
The Future of Domain Name Dispute Resolution: Crafting Practical International Legal Solutions From Within
the UDRP Framework, 51 Duke L. J. 817 (2001); Wayde Brooks, Wrestling Over the World Wide Web:
ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for Domain Name Disputes, 22 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 297
(2001); Stacy King, The “Law That It Deems Applicable”: ICANN Dispute Resolution, and the Problem of
Cybersquatting, 22 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. (2000); Christopher Rains, A Domain By Any Other Name:
Forging International Solutions for the Governance of Internet Domain Names, 14 Emory INT’L L. REV. 355
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The characteristics and facts of the disputes together with an
analysis of the results of panel decisions have provided the basis for
most of the empirical studies of the UDRP.37 Common criticisms are
that the providers have incentives to favor the complainants and that
the rules favor proprietary interests in the Internet.38 Some of these
perceived flaws may stem from the political structure of ICANN.39
In this paper, we thoroughly critique the performance of the
UDRP providers and identify the main variables that determine the
ICANN’s efficiency. For example, one of the key variables, and also
a main concern of ICANN, is the duration of the procedure to decide
these cases.40 We analyze the decisions of the complainants in
deciding to send their claim to a particular dispute resolution
provider. Using a multinomial logit regression model to determine if
complainants select the provider based on bias or the duration of the
procedure, we show that duration is at least as important as bias in
selecting providers. This is a key finding because our results show
that the emphasis of other theoretical and empirical work that has
exclusively concentrated on the effects of bias is misplaced.
Consequently, we recommend that more attention should be paid to
other performance and efficiency indicators, particularly the
indicators proposed in this paper. In our empirical analysis, we used
(2000); Stephen Ware, Domain-Name Arbitration in the Arbitration-Law Context: Consent to, and Fairness in,
the UDRP, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 129 (2002); Edward Brunet, Defending Commerce’s Contract
Delegation of power to ICANN, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (2002); Kathleen Fuller, ICANN: The
Debate Over Governing the Internet, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2 (2001); Leah Phillips Falzone, Playing
The Hollywood Name Game In Cybercourt: The Battle Over Domain Names In The Age Of CelebritySquatting, 21 LOY. L. A. ENT. L. REV. 289 (2001); Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem Of
Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L. J. 187 (2001); Neil Batavia, That Which We Call a Domain By Any Other Name
Would Smell as Sweet: The Overboard Protection of Trademark Law as it Applies to Domain Names on the
Internet, 53 S. C. L. REV. 461 (2002); Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain
Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149 (2000); Gregory Blasbalg, Masters of Their Domains:
Trademark Holders Now Have New Ways to Control Their Marks in Cyberspace, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 563 (2000); Olivia Baratta and Dana Hanaman, A Global Update on the Domain Name System and the
Law: alternative Dispute Resolution for Increasing Internet Competition. Oh, the Times They Are AChangin’!, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 325 (2000); David Post, Of Black Holes and Decentralized LawMaking in Cyberspace, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 70 (2000); Gillian Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law:
Lessons From ICANN, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 257 (2002).
37. Id.
38. “. . .[T]he procedural design of ICANN’s UDRP has a number of special features that resulted in an
especially unjust set of outcomes. Key decisions were made by unrepresentative groups or persons who were
not subject to any democratic control, and the rules went in effect because of ICANN’s monopoly over
technical aspect of the Internet, not because any legislature approved them.” Froomkin, supra note 17, at 712.
See Geist, supra note 35 and Thornburg, supra note 30 (analyzing the bias of the UDRP providers that favored
complainants).
39. Jay Kesan & Andres Gallo, ICANN Politics: Changes and Constituencies, draft manuscript 2004 (on
file with the authors).
40. “[T]he main advantage of using the UDRP over filing a lawsuit is that it can generally provide an
inexpensive and quick resolution for domain name disputes. Because there is no discovery process and no
absolute right to file endless replies and subreplies after the initial filing of the complaint and the response, the
costs of a UDRP proceeding can be much less than seeking a preliminary injunction in court. However, using
the UDRP effectively requires thorough advance preparation, investigation and research.” Jeffrey Look, Law
and Order on the Wild, Wild West (WWW), 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 817, 824-825 (2002).
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the duration of the cases as the variable to measure the general
efficiency of each provider. Additionally, we applied regression
models based on the analysis of the system’s duration to identify
different factors that determine the system’s performance.
In studying the actual performance of providers, we have
found that the UDRP providers have different duration functions.
Moreover, because there are different procedures, different review
processes, and different technologies used to handle these cases,
forum shopping is very likely to exist. This existence of forum
shopping based on the performance of the providers is different from
forum shopping based on the bias of the provider towards the
complainant.41 These results are supported by: (1) the fact that the
two most important domain name dispute resolution providers are
located at the extremes of the possible technological structures of the
UDRP; and (2) the fact that the providers have an unambiguous bias
for specific countries. This finding is important because most of the
literature discussing provider bias focuses on bias between particular
individuals. In addition, the geographical bias towards the countries
of origin of the providers is important when analyzing the design of a
general dispute system such as the UDRP. Additionally, the
evidence of such bias strongly contradicts ICANN’s claim that the
system is intended to handle the most diverse claims involving the
Internet, regardless of the parties’ origins.42
We also found that some panelists have a completely
different duration function in deciding cases than the rest of the cases
viewed collectively under any private provider. That said, structural
differences among providers can influence the panelists’
performance. Interestingly, the fact that some panelists exhibit a
different behavior from the rest of the panelists within the same
provider could be beneficial and providers should give these
panelists more cases to handle. At the same time, panelists
consistently favoring one party over another should be evaluated
carefully and perhaps not handle as many cases. This evidence calls
into question the overall manner in which providers assign cases to
the panelists. In addition, we find that the evidence presented by
41. See Froomkin, supra note 17.
42. “At the UDRP’s inception, ICANN had three main objectives it sought to achieve. The first goal
was to create global uniformity. An example of this would be to eliminate competition among jurisdictions –
forum shopping- and rules that are applied to domain name and trademark disputes. The second goal was to
reduce the cost of resolving disputes. Finally, the UDRP was intended to be heavily restricted in its
applicability. It was supposed to be geared toward the most flagrant types of cybersquatting, while other
disputes would be left to the courts.” Pamela Segal, Attempts to Solve the UDRP’s trademark Holder Bias: A
Problem That Remains Unsolved Despite the Introduction of New Top Level Domain Names, 3 CARDOZO
ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 23 (2001).
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complainants and respondents affects the performance of the
providers. Finally, we evaluate the differences in performance
between one and three member panels. We find that three member
panels are as efficient as single member panels. Accordingly,
changing to a general three member panel system could promote
fairness without creating a negative impact on efficiency.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the
ICANN-UDRP system and the providers in charge of the dispute
resolution process. Second, we present a regression model to
analyze the selection process employed by the complainants in
choosing a dispute resolution provider. We also describe the
regression technique used for the empirical analysis and the
characteristics of the database. Third, we present a general empirical
analysis of the UDRP system providers. Fourth, we analyze the
regression model and present the results from the model. Fifth, we
analyze the results in terms of the policy recommendations derived
from these results. Finally, we present our conclusions.

II. ICANN-UDRP Characteristics
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) manages the IP address space allocation, protocol
parameter assignment, domain name system management, and root
server system management functions on the Internet.43 ICANN is a
non-profit organization created in 1998 by the Department of
Commerce and supported by various countries.44 Among its various
43. See http://www.icann.org/general/abouticann.htm, For history and development of ICANN. See
Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution,
50 Duke L. J. 17 (2000), Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward A Critical Theory Of
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (January 2003), Edward C. Anderson and Timothy S. Cole, The UDRPA Model for Dispute Resolution in E-commerce? 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 235 (2002).
44. “Formed in October 1998, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a
non-profit, private-sector corporation formed by a broad coalition of the Internet’s business, technical,
academic, and user communities. ICANN has been recognized by the U.S. and other governments as the global
consensus entity to coordinate the technical management of the Internet’s domain name system, the allocation
of IP address space, the assignment of protocol parameters, and the management of the root server system.”
See, http://www.icann.org/general/fact-sheet.htm. “Prior to the formation of ICANN,
administration of the authoritative list ultimately linking particular names and numbers (Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses) to specific computers was the responsibility of various departments of the U.S. government and,
later, Network Solutions Inc. (NSI), a for profit corporation operating under contract with the U.S. Department
of Commerce. . . . Objections to the monopoly over registration services held by NSI (and the U.S.
government) led in 1998 to the creation of ICANN and in particular ICANN’s capacity to authorize multiple
registrars to compete over registration services.” Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law: Lessons
From ICANN. 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 257, 259-260 (2002).
Many critics have said that ICANN received important power from the U.S. government, which were reserved
for the government instead of a private institution. See for example, Michael Froomkin, supra note __
(claiming that the ICANN creation is not consistent with both the Constitution and the Administrative
Procedure Act). However, this is a highly debatable topic, as can be seen in Edward Brunet, Defending
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activities, the management of the domain name system has proven to
be a delicate area where property and trademark rights from the real
world collide with the unregulated aspects of the Internet.45
Although trademark and property rights laws in different countries
could have protected new domain names assigned on the Internet,
there are many problems related to local courts’ inability to
adequately handle Internet-based disputes.46 As a result, conflicts
over the rights of domain names on the Internet generated a need for
an arbitration mechanism to resolve these disputes.47
Private actors interested in creating an arbitration system and
with influence over ICANN, together with other organizations like
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), promoted the
creation of a dispute resolution mechanism for domain names.
WIPO, in turn, produced a report for ICANN detailing the necessity
of creating a dispute resolution system and proposing specific rules
for such a system.48 This report was the blue print for the new
regime created by ICANN.49
In 1999, ICANN enacted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP).50 The UDRP authorized a number of
private third-party institutions (Providers) to evaluate disputes
among Internet users regarding rights over domain names.51 ICANN
designed a series of general rules to regulate the dispute resolution
procedures, leaving the private providers to add their own
Ecommerce’s Contract Delegation of Power to ICANN. 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (2002).
45. See Jay Kesan and Andres Gallo, Optimizing Internet Regulation, (forthcoming University of
Cincinnati Law Review (describing the problems of regulation in the Internet).
46. See Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275 (2002)
(analyzing the problems courts have in dealing with Internet related issues).
47. “Reconciling the competing interests of trademark owners and domain name registrants has not
proved an easy task, either nationally or internationally. The territorial nature of trademark rights, the lack of a
single body of rules governing trademark-domain name disputes, the difficulty of locating registrants, and the
possibility that different domain name registrants own multiple iterations of a preexisting mark all make the
prospect of litigating before national courts protracted, expensive and perhaps even futile. Not surprisingly,
trademark owners have expressed interest in streamlined and inexpensive non-national dispute settlement
alternatives, particularly for disputes with a class of domain name registrants known as cybersquatters.”
Laurence R. Helfer and Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141, 154-155 (2001).
48. See http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (describing the timetable of creation of the UDRP
with links to WIPO initiative). See Laurence R. Helfer and Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National
Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141 (2001)
(describing the proposal of WIPO and the reforms introduced by ICANN when implementing the system.)
49. See Froomkin, supra note 17 (describing the differences between WIPO proposal and the final
ICANN’s UDRP.)
50. See Helfer and Dinwoodie, supra note 46. (describing the creation of the UDRP). See also the
ICANN timeline for development and application of the policy, http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrpschedule.htm.
51. The approved providers are: World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) December 1st 1999,
The National Forum Arbitration (NAF) December 23rd 1999, eResolutions (eRes) January 1st 2000 (terminated
November 30th 2001), CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution (CPR) May 22nd 2000 and Asian Domain Name
2002,
at
Dispute
Resolution
Centre
(ADNDRC)
February
28th
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm.
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complementary rules to the system.52 ICANN’s derived its ability to
enforce and apply the UDRP regime to the registered domain names
from the contract each user enters with ICANN at the moment of
registering a new domain name.53 In the following section, we
describe the main characteristics of the UDRP system and identify
the weaknesses and strengths of this regime. We also delineate the
questions tested with our regression model.
PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT
The general procedure for considering complaints is
competitive and one in which different organizations are able to offer
dispute resolution services to users.54 This process is different from
the other typical alternative dispute resolution regimes such as those
used to resolve disputes over privacy rights. In alternative dispute
resolution regimes, the choice of private provider is imposed by the
individual web site that is visited.55 In the UDRP system, Internet
users can choose the provider knowing that the underlying set of
rules is uniform. However, by letting the complainant choose the
provider, ICANN has created an incentive for providers to favor
complainants in their decisions.56
ICANN provides a set of rules that delimits the regulated
issues, the cases that providers should evaluate the penalties, and the
52. The two main instruments that regulate the system are the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP) and the Rules for the Uniform Domain Dispute Resolution Policy, both documents
were approved on October 24th 1999. See, http://www.icann.org/udrp/. Each provider can produce its
own rules in those areas not regulated by the Policy. For supplemental rules, see
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm.
53. “When ICANN licenses a registrar to offer a .com, .net, .org, .info, .biz, or shortly, .name secondlevel domains, that registrar agrees to incorporate the UDRP into its agreement with the registrant; therefore,
all domain names in those TLD’s are subject to its terms.” Goldstein, supra note 35, at 1161.
“One can see the superficial appeal of an ICANN-like process to resolve international Internet disputes. First,
it applies globally. . . . This eliminates the tricky issue of personal jurisdiction over the domain name holder. It
also manages to create a contractually mandated private system for the benefit of noncontracting parties.
Second, because the process does not require (or even allow) personal appearances by the parties, it minimizes
geographic distance problems. . . . Third, the UDRP attempts to overcome the choice of the law problems
raised by differences in national trademark laws by creating its own “law” in the ICANN Policy. Finally,
because ICANN has a contract with the company that controls the root server that assigns domain names, it
has the power to enforce the arbitrators’ decisions without the need to ask a court to enforce the judgment.”
Thornburg, supra note 30,at 196.
54. The two main instruments that regulate the system are the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP) and the Rules for the Uniform Domain Dispute Resolution Policy, both documents
approved in October 24th 1999. See, http://www.icann.org/udrp/. Each provider can produce its own rules in
those areas not regulated by the Policy. For supplemental rules, see http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approvedproviders.htm.
55. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 44 (analyzing the efficiency of top-down and bottom-up regulation
for privacy rights in e-commerce).
56. See Giest, supra note 35, and Froomkin, supra note 17 (analyzing the bias of the UDRP providers
with respect to complainants).
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minimum requirements for the panel’s composition.57 ICANN also
allows providers freedom to implement further rules and to charge
the corresponding fees.58 This framework has both created good
incentives for competition among providers of domain name dispute
resolution services offered at reasonably low cost59 and generated
problems of bias favoring complainants.60 The complaints evaluated
under the UDRP are only those related to domain name disputes.61
In summary, the current system favors providers who are friendly to
complainants, and the providers’ optimal strategy is to favor
complainants in order to ensure that they continue to be chosen in the
future.62
Figure 1 shows the different stages the claim goes through
during the procedure. These stages can vary marginally because of
the providers’ different supplemental rules. The complainant can file
a complaint with any of the approved providers that ICANN has
authorized.63 Once the provider receives the complaint, the provider
has to evaluate the complaint’s validity. If the complaint is not valid,
then the provider could either ask for further information or discard
57. See http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (listing the policy rules). See Appendix A for a list
of the main requirements for the disputes to be considered valid. For an analysis of the policy see Michael
Froomkin supra note 17.
58. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
59. “Considering that the filling fee for a dispute involving a single domain name, heard by a single
panelist, can be as low as $1,150. The UDRP is an attractive alternative to protracted litigation. While there are
several factors that contribute to the low cost of a UDRP proceeding, the primary reason is the simplicity of the
process. The administrative panel is limited to considering the written submissions made by the parties. The
UDRP does not provide for discovery or submission of interrogatories by the parties, elements that typically
increase the cost of other processes, in both time and money.” Edward C. Anderson and Timothy S. Cole, The
UDRP- A Model for Dispute Resolution in E-commerce? 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 235, 249 (2002).
60. “This study provides compelling evidence that forum shopping has become an integral part of the
UDRP and that the system may indeed be biased in favor of trademark holders. Both WIPO and NAF, the two
dominant ICANN accredited arbitration providers, feature case allocation that suggests that the panelist
selection process is not random. Rather, it appears to be heavily biased toward ensuring that a majority of cases
are steered toward complainant friendly panelists. Moreover, the data shows that there is a correlation between
the provider panelist selection and case outcome. When providers control who decides a case, as they do for all
single panel cases, complainants win just over 83% of the time. As provider influence over panelists
diminishes, as occurs in three-member panel cases, the complainant winning percentage drops to 60%.” Geist,
supra note 35, at 936.
61. “All other disputes between you and any party other than us regarding your domain name
registration that are not brought pursuant to the mandatory administrative proceeding provisions of Paragraph
4 shall be resolved between you and such other party through any court, arbitration or other proceeding that
may be available.” UDRP part 5, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm.
62. It is interesting to notice that the only provider that declared bankruptcy was e-Resolution, which
was the one with more cases won by respondents.
“Rather than both sides having equal input into who will decide the case, the complainant chooses the arbitral
tribunal from a small list of approved providers maintained by ICANN. Unlike standard arbitration clauses
where the provider is specified in the presumably bargained-for contract or negotiated by the parties at the time
of the dispute, the respondent has no say in which provider will manage her case, and no peremptory
challenges to arbitrators she may fear are biased. The respondent can, however, pick one member of a threeperson panel at her own expense if the complainant opted for a single panelist and the respondent decides three
are needed. Overall, the system gives dispute resolution providers an economic incentive to compete by being
complainant-friendly.” Froomkin, supra note 17, at 671-672.
63. See Appendix A for a graphic description of complaints procedure.
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the complaint. If the complaint is valid, then the case must be
resolved by the provider who asks the respondent to submit a defense
responding to the complaint. Once the respondent has submitted an
answer, or the respondent is declared in default, the provider forms a
panel. This panel can be either a one or a three-member panel,
depending on the request of the parties.64 In contrast to other
alternative dispute resolution forums that operate in the privacy
rights area (ADRs), the panelists in Figure 1 are elected from a list
specified by the provider and agreed to by the parties.65 As a result,
even though the complainant can elect the provider, the respondent
has the choice of determining the panel’s composition. This makes
the panel more transparent than privacy rights forums, where the
provider directly appoints the panelists without intervention by the
parties.66

64.

According with the UDRP the panel is formed as follows: “APPOINTMENT OF THE PANEL AND TIMING

OF DECISION

(a) Each Provider shall maintain and publish a publicly available list of panelists and their qualifications.
(b) If neither the Complainant nor the Respondent has elected a three-member Panel (Paragraphs 3(b)(iv) and
5(b)(iv)), the Provider shall appoint, within five (5) calendar days following receipt of the response by the
Provider, or the lapse of the time period for the submission thereof, a single Panelist from its list of panelists.
The fees for a single-member Panel shall be paid entirely by the Complainant.
(c) If either the Complainant or the Respondent elects to have the dispute decided by a three-member Panel,
the Provider shall appoint three Panelists in accordance with the procedures identified in Paragraph 6(e). The
fees for a three-member Panel shall be paid in their entirety by the Complainant, except where the election for
a three-member Panel was made by the Respondent, in which case the applicable fees shall be shared equally
between the Parties.
(d) Unless it has already elected a three-member Panel, the Complainant shall submit to the Provider, within
five (5) calendar days of communication of a response in which the Respondent elects a three-member Panel,
the names and contact details of three candidates to serve as one of the Panelists. These candidates may be
drawn from any ICANN-approved Provider’s list of panelists.
(e) In the event that either the Complainant or the Respondent elects a three-member Panel, the Provider shall
endeavor to appoint one Panelist from the list of candidates provided by each of the Complainant and the
Respondent. In the event the Provider is unable within five (5) calendar days to secure the appointment of a
Panelist on its customary terms from either Party’s list of candidates, the Provider shall make that appointment
from its list of panelists. The third Panelist shall be appointed by the Provider from a list of five candidates
submitted by the Provider to the Parties, the Provider’s selection from among the five being made in a manner
that reasonably balances the preferences of both Parties, as they may specify to the Provider within five (5)
calendar days of the Provider’s submission of the five-candidate list to the Parties.
(f) Once the entire Panel is appointed, the Provider shall notify the Parties of the Panelists appointed and the
date by which, absent exceptional circumstances, the Panel shall forward its decision on the complaint to the
Provider.” UDRP at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm
65. Agreement takes place in at least the three-member panel case.
66. See previous section.
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FIGURE 1: UDRP GENERAL PROCEDURE
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Withdrawal
No

Nonetheless, respondent participation takes place only in the case of
three-member panels. Otherwise, the provider is in charge of
appointing the panelists. This procedure has problems caused by the
bias providers have in favoring complainants.67
Once the panel forms, it has to decide the case. The panel
also has the power to ask for additional information from any of the
parties. In the event that the parties reach a private agreement, the
panel terminates its process, without any further decision. Also, if
any of the parties initiate a court trial, the panel can continue with its
deliberations or decide to terminate the case.68 Even though the rules
of the UDRP provide that both parties have the same grace period to
take a case to court, some scholars have suggested that the short time
available is detrimental for respondents.69 One of the main
limitations of these types of dispute resolution regimes is that
providers do not have jurisdiction in matters initiated in court.70 That
said, most UDRP cases do not reach the courts.71

67. “Given these inevitable biases, the ICANN Policy fails in another important way. Each DRP lists a
number of approved arbitrators, but there is no information about how particular individuals are assigned to
particular cases, particularly those involving only one arbitrator. In those cases, the parties have no input into
the assignment of the arbitrator. Except in cases of the most obvious and improper kind of bias, it is unlikely a
party could successfully challenge a panelist. Each DRP has its own procedural rules regarding challenges.
The grounds upon which a challenge can be brought also vary. For example, NAF sets forth specific grounds
for disqualification. None would preclude an arbitrator with known attitudes about meaning of controversial
UDRP provisions from deciding a case. Nor is there a system for allowing parties, after a proceeding is over,
to register complaints about a particular decision maker.” Thornburg, supra note 30, at 222.
68. “K. AVAILABILITY OF COURT PROCEEDINGS. The mandatory administrative proceeding requirements
set forth in Paragraph 4 shall not prevent either you or the complainant from submitting the dispute to a court
of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before such mandatory administrative proceeding is
commenced or after such proceeding is concluded. If an Administrative Panel decides that your domain name
registration should be canceled or transferred, we will wait ten (10) business days (as observed in the location
of our principal office) after we are informed by the applicable Provider of the Administrative Panel’s decision
before implementing that decision. We will then implement the decision unless we have received from you
during that ten (10) business day period official documentation (such as a copy of a complaint, file-stamped by
the clerk of the court) that you have commenced a lawsuit against the complainant in a jurisdiction to which
the complainant has submitted under Paragraph 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure. (In general, that
jurisdiction is either the location of our principal office or of your address as shown in our Whois database. See
Paragraphs 1 and 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure for details.) If we receive such documentation within the
ten (10) business day period, we will not implement the Administrative Panel’s decision, and we will take no
further action, until we receive (i) evidence satisfactory to us of a resolution between the parties; (ii) evidence
satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been dismissed or withdrawn; or (iii) a copy of an order from such court
dismissing your lawsuit or ordering that you do not have the right to continue to use your domain name.”
UDRP part 4.k, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm.
69. See Froomkin, supra note 17 (analyzing the extent of the bias for respondents resorting to court
action).
70. “Although a UDRP decision is, in some respects, self-enforcing, it is not binding. Either before or
after a UDRP decision, either party can take the matter to court. Even after an adverse decision under the
UDRP, a respondent could pursue de novo litigation against a successful claimant. This ability to “appeal” an
unsuccessful UDRP case was recently affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals.” Edward Anderson and
Timothy Cole, supra note 59, at 250.
71. According to UDRPLaw.net, until July 2002, just 65 UDRP cases were taken to court. This is a
small number as compared with the more than 6,000 cases UDRP providers had considered since 1999. See,
http://www.udrplaw.net/.
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One of the problems of the UDRP procedure is the absence of
a review mechanism for complaints.72 This type of mechanism is in
place in other private ADRs and could provide for better review and
control of the panelists’ decisions.73 Conversely, one of the main
advantages of the UDRP regime in comparison to other private
dispute resolution systems for the Internet is that ICANN has the
power to enforce the panel decisions.74 In contrast, the only action
that the panel can enforce is the termination or transfer of the
disputed domain name under ICANN’s management.75 Enforcement
in these situations is almost perfect when compared to the lack of
enforcement that privacy rights dispute resolution providers, dealing
with different jurisdictions and the lack of government support, have
to contend with.76 The enforcement ability arises from both
ICANN’s design and the design of the root system that favors an
uncompetitive market for root names.77 The legitimacy of ICANN’s
functions, at least among the groups that have direct influence on
ICANN’s Board of Directors, provides the basis for enforcing the
rules on domain name dispute resolution.78 These characteristics,
based on governmental delegation of powers to ICANN, make the
UDRP one of the most viable systems for dispute resolution on the
Internet.
In order to maintain its legitimacy among countries and
different Internet users and beyond the groups that are currently part
of the policymaking process, ICANN must develop new ways to
incorporate the many constituencies of the Internet into its decision-

72. “UDRP arbitrators have rendered decisions that are inconsistent in their interpretation of the
substantive requirements and in their implementation of the procedural rules. Because the process contains no
internal appeal process, there is no way to challenge any of these decisions, either to correct the result in an
individual case or to reconcile splits in what is becoming the “law” of ICANN. There is no way to correct
arbitrators who are creating bad “law” or those who believe that trademark holders should have broader rights
than those included in the UDRP as written.” Thornburg, supra note 30, at 224.
73. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 44 (describing the procedure of private ADRs).
74. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
75. Again, the characteristic of the Root system for the Internet, which is managed and monopolized by
ICANN generates a disincentive to other providers to offer other roots of Domain Names. As a result, the
actual design of the system provides ICANN with a well defined power of enforcement of the UDRP. See
Mueller, supra note 35 (describing the lack of competition and monopoly of ICANN and the incentives the
organization participants have to maintain the system as it is).
76. One of the main weaknesses in enforcement is the existence of diverse roots in the Internet.
Nonetheless, because ICANN is the most important of these servers, there are just a few domain names that
cannot be reached by ICANN enforcement capabilities. The case of ccTLDs are special since they are can be
limited to the national jurisdictions of the participant countries.
“An important aspect of the UDRP is the enforceability of the decisions. Although trademark holders only
have two remedies available to them under the UDRP, enforcement of a successful result is automatic (absent
court action by the respondent).” Anderson and Cole supra note 59, at 250.
77. Id.
78. Legitimacy of ICANN actions have been under strong debate lately. See, Helfer and Dinwoodie,
supra note 20 (discussing how the problems of the UDRP undermine the legitimacy under which it is based).
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making process.79 Some constituencies on the Internet have a high
degree of control over ICANN’s policymaking process. Meanwhile,
other groups, mainly users, but also the private sector, have a low
level of participation.80 The future success of the UDRP and ICANN
will depend upon the political pressure exerted on ICANN to involve
new participants and to develop new ways of allowing influence to
wide-ranging interest groups.81 In contrast to the privacy rights
providers, the UDRP’s particular structure makes it subject to both
criticism and change. At the same time, the UDRP’s structure
creates an opportunity to maintain the consensus on common set of
rules of the system.
B. NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS

Under the UDRP system, most of the domain name owners
are subject to the regulations of the UDRP.82 Consequently, every
person or entity that registers a new domain name is subject to
ICANN’s policies.83 Thus, the UDRP system experiences wide
coverage and uniform regulation throughout most of the Internet.
This feature is another important distinction from other attempts to
create private dispute resolution systems having voluntary regulatory
regimes.84 As the only institution that manages domain names and
receives support from different governments, ICANN generates a
quasi-automatic jurisdiction for those who request a new domain
name in any of the gTLDs.
C. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In the case of the UDRP, the nature of the issue regulated
permits better enforcement of the rules.85 However, international
79. See Froomkin, supra note 17 (questioning the legitimacy of ICANN to impose its policies in the
Internet.)
80. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 38 (discussing the political process inside ICANN).
81. Id.
82. This characteristic depends on the concentrated structure of the root system and the lack of
competition. See Mueller, supra note 16.
83. “1. PURPOSE. This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”) has been
adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), is incorporated by
reference into your Registration Agreement, and sets forth the terms and conditions in connection with a
dispute between you and any party other than us (the registrar) over the registration and use of an Internet
domain name registered by you. Proceedings under Paragraph 4 of this Policy will be conducted according to
the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules of Procedure”), which are
available at www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm, and the selected administrative-dispute-resolution
service provider’s supplemental rules.” UDRP part 1, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm.
84. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 44.
85. “ICANN has largely succeeded in solving the enforcement dilemma, although it is not a solution
that could easily be replicated in a different context. Because ICANN has a contract with Network Solutions,
Inc., which controls the computer that physically assigns each domain name, it can not self enforce the UDRP
decision. A winning complainant will either be awarded the domain name at issue or the name will be
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cooperation is needed to sustain the policy that is put in place
throughout the Internet.86 Because the U.S. government supported
ICANN, other developed countries now support ICANN’s
jurisdiction to resolve domain name disputes.87 Nonetheless, most
ccTLDs are still out of the reach of ICANN’s jurisdiction over
UDRP policy.88
The technical dependency of ccTLDs on ICANN, and on the
United States government, hinders the actual reach of the sovereignty
of country code managers.89 The reforms of ICANN’s political
structure in 2002 provided for more participation to ccTLDs and
facilitated a wider international consensus on ICANN policies.90
Some characteristics of the ICANN structure help explain this
success in reaching international consensus. First, the management
structure of ICANN has become more open to participation and, after
recent reforms, the international community has more influence on
ICANN policymaking.91
Different global constituencies can
participate in the decision-making and shaping of ICANN policies.92
Major changes in the election of Board members and in levels of
participation of Country Code Registries (ccTLDs) have resulted
from ICANN in becoming an international body with jurisdiction
over the Internet.93 These changes will permit more cooperation at
cancelled.” Thornburg, supra note 30, at 207.
86. The need for international cooperation is explained by the participation of ccTLDs as one of the
most active ICANN constituencies. Furthermore, it is through these international actors that ICANN can
cooperate in the developing of rules that apply throughout the Internet. Recently, ccTLDs have upgraded their
participation and voice in ICANN policymaking process. See next section discussion.
87. See http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-whois.htm (listing all the countries that participate in ICANN).
88. Up to today, only a handful of ccTLDs have signed Sponsorship Agreements with ICANN. See
http://www.icann.org/cctlds/ (showing information about the ccTLDs managers that signed agreements with
ICANN).
89. “Technically, the ccTLDs are subdomains of the “root domain” created by the U.S. government and
“contained” in the root zone file. Despite the U.S. reservation of technical control over the A root, the U.S.
government states that “[n]ational governments now have, and will continue to have, authority to manage or
establish policy for their own ccTLDs,” thereby attempting to downplay the influence that the U.S. may
indirectly have over the policies of nations foreign to the U.S. At the same time, the U.S. maintained that
national governments and intergovernmental organizations should not directly manage the Internet names and
addresses. On this account, ICANN was intended to be a purely technical coordinating body, whereas national
governments would continue to control national politics.” Kim G. von Arx and Gregory R. Hagen, A
Declaration of Independence of ccTLDs from Foreign Control, 9 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20 (2002).
90. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 38. (describing the creation of a ccNSO constituency to participate
directly in the management of ICANN).
91. Id. (analyzing how the pressure groups inside ICANN successfully resisted changes to their political
influence).
92. See http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-15dec02.htm (listing the new bylaws of
ICANN with important changes in the influence of different groups on the policy process).
93. Until December 15th 2002 the Board of Directors of the ICANN was composed of nineteen
members. Five of them came from the original Board of Directors established in 1998 and the other 14 came
from the following organizations: 5 from the At Large Membership. Each of these directors should represent a
different geographic unit: Africa, Asia-Australia-Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean and North
America. 3 Board Members came from the Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO). The DNSO was
composed of different constituency groups: Business, Non-Commercial, ccTLD Registries, gTLD Registries,
ISPs, Registrars and Intellectual Property Constituency. 3 Board Members came from the Address Supporting
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the international level, allowing for better enforcement of dispute
resolution policies.94 Including international actors will also increase
the need for UDRP reform to accommodate different international
perspectives. For example, the growth of the Internet in Asia and the
interest of ICANN to continue being the main source of control and
regulation over domain names have prompted the creation of two
new offices, one in Hong Kong and the other in Beijing.95 These
offices resolve disputes in the Asian region.96 As a result, the UDRP
could accommodate different views and be open to changes, even
though the groups with more power inside ICANN will resist such
reforms.97
Second, the constituencies that form the board of ICANN
were created to allow people from different countries to be part of
ICANN and to have a voice in the political process.98 Nonetheless,
groups and constituencies that were introduced as initial parts of the
organization have controlled ICANN.99 As ICANN attempts to gain
more international influence, these constituencies should
accommodate the private sector, internet users, and the government.
ICANN is an institution in its formative stage, where
different constituencies and groups are trying to establish positions in
the management of the institution, but without an established
procedure or representation.100 The forces that shape the political
Organization (ASO). This group was composed by the Asian Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC),
American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN), Latin American and Caribbean Internet Address Registry
(LACNIC) and Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre (RIPENCC). Finally, 3 Board Members
came from the Protocol Supporting Organizations (PSO). The PSO was composed by the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), International Communication Union (ITU-T)
and the European Telecommunications Standard Institute (ETSI).
According to the new By-Laws of the ICANN, beginning in December 15, 2002, the Board of Directors should
be composed of 15 members elected as follows: 8 Directors from the Nominating Committee, 2 from ASO, 2
from Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO), 2 by Generic Name Supporting Organization
(GNSO) and the President of ICANN. The Nominating Committee is composed as follows: 5 from At Large
Representation, 2 from Business Constituency of GNSO), 1 from gTLD Registry, 1 from gTLD Registrars, 1
from Council Country Code NSO, 1 from ISP constituency GNSO, 1 from Intellectual Property Constituency
GNSO, 1 from ASO, 1 designated by ICANN Board to represent Academy and other similar institutions, 1
from Consumer and Civil Society Groups from the Non-commercial constituency of GNSO, 1 from IETF and
1 from ICANN Technical Liaison Group. See http://www.icann.org/general/archivebylaws/bylaws-15dec02.htm#VI for a complete version of the new By-Laws of ICANN.
94. See http://www.icann.org/cctlds/ (describing the objectives and activities of ccTLDs in ICANN).
95. See http://www.adndrc.org/adndrc/index.html.
96. Id.
97. The analysis of the next section is a good example on how stakeholders of ICANN could resist
major reforms on the policymaking and retain power.
98. “The ICANN Bylaws provide for three Supporting Organizations (SOs) to assist, review and
develop recommendations on Internet policy and structure within three specialized areas. (See Bylaws,
Articles VIII, IX, and X.) The SOs help to promote the development of Internet policy and encourage diverse
and international participation in the technical management of the Internet. Each SO names three Directors to
the ICANN Board” http://www.icann.org/general/support-orgs.htm (describing the different
constituencies that support ICANN).
99. See next section.
100. The reform process initiated in 2002 and the debate about the role of ICANN and the division of
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characteristics of ICANN will also shape the rules of its dispute
resolution policy. In the end, ICANN’s success in promoting and
enforcing a set of dispute resolution rules for domain names on the
Internet will be due to both the capacity of ICANN’s constituencies
to accommodate different demands and the political process inside
the corporation that enables such a process to occur.
D. USER PARTICIPATION
User participation under the UDRP is much higher than in the
previous case study of the privacy rights third party institutions
(TPIs).101 First, every user that registers a domain name on the
ICANN-managed root server falls automatically under the
jurisdiction of the provider and is subject to the rules of the UDRP.102
Second, ICANN has provided, at least theoretically, numerous ways
by which users can contact the organization and propose reforms to
the dispute resolution system.103 In ICANN, users have direct
participation on the Board of Directors and elect representatives in
the At Large Group and the GNSO group.104 Despite this
participation, user participation in ICANN policymaking is scarce.
Instead, the commercial private sector is the main power that is in
control of ICANN. Ultimately, although ICANN fares better than
the privacy rights TPIs, ICANN prefers private firms’ interests
regarding domain name policies.
ICANN’s critics point to the lack of democratic participation
in its decision-making.105 Because ICANN has strictly controlled the
number of top-level domain names, ICANN has created an artificial
scarcity in the market.106 In response, specific private firms have

power among different constituencies is a proof that ICANN is an organization in a formation stage.
101. From the many critics mentioned in footnote 20, user participation in ICANN is far from ideal.
However, we found it more important than in the case of purely private regulation systems.
102. “All registrars in the .aero, .biz, .com, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, .net, and .org top-level domains
follow the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (often referred to as the “UDRP”).” Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/
103. See http://www.icann.org/. (describing multiple instruments users have to reach ICANN and
participate).
104. See http://www.icann.org/committees/alac/ (describing the tasks and composition of the At Large
Group) and http://gnso.icann.org/ (describing and informing about the different constituencies that are
part of the GNSO).
105. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
106. “ICANN’s attempts to safeguard intellectual property interests in the domain name space also
shaped its policies toward the introduction of new top-level domains. New TLDs were given a low priority
relative to other objectives. Movement toward that goal was extremely slow. When new ones were introduced,
the number was small and the approval process encouraged registries to employ practices that would privilege
trademark holders in the initial assignment of names. So-called “sunrise” or “daybreak” procedures, for
example, allow all the world’s trademark holders the privilege of preregistering their names in a new top-level
domain before the domain is opened up to anyone else. Both techniques offer preemptive forms of protection
that simply do not exist in traditional trademark law.” Mueller, supra note 16, at 193.
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developed an interest in controlling this artificial scarcity.107 By
allowing private firms to compete with each other and provide
options in the top-level domain name arena, ICANN could improve
users’ welfare by providing more alternatives than what currently
exists.108 Competition at this level, however, will decrease the value
of the top domain names that already exist today, thus hurting the
profits of the firms that control them. As firms develop significant
influence over ICANN’s decisions, the firms will exert pressure to
avoid competition.
If, however, ICANN wants to promote
cooperation and continue to advance in its governance of the domain
name system, it should accommodate users’ demands.
One of the most common criticisms of the UDRP is that the
domain name rules enforced by providers unfairly protect trademark
holders’ interests on the Internet, at the expense of free speech
interests.109 For example, if somebody registers a domain name
called FIFAWorldCup.com, devoted to criticizing the way the
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) has
designed the classification groups for the 2006 World Cup in
Germany, FIFA could claim that this domain name infringes on its
own trademark rights and seek to cancel this registration by initiating
a complaint with a UDRP provider. These kinds of problems have
arisen because of the small number of top-level domain names and
the broad definitions applied for the type of content that is admissible
under each top-level domain name.
Another example arises if ICANN creates a new top-level
domain name for free speech, such as .fsp, in which all domain name
registrants have to be individuals or non-commercial entities. In
such a situation, all names, including trademarks, together with a
prohibition against undertaking commercial activities in this space,
function to accommodate many of the free speech concerns. ICANN
may then have a commercial set of top-level domain names in
requiring trademarks for name assignment and also a free speech
section where users can express themselves without fear censorship.
Nonetheless, under the current interests that dominate ICANN, such
a simple technical change is unexpected.110

107. Id.
108. See Milton Mueller, Success by Default: A New Profile of Domain Name Trademark Disputes under
ICANN’s UDRP, Convergence Center working Paper, June 2002 (describing the scarcity created by ICANN in
the gTLDs registry).
109. See Blackman, supra note 21 (analyzing the issues of free speech in the Internet, with particular
reference to the Domain Name System).
110. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 39.
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Internet users participate more in the UDRP than in any other
privacy rights forums.111 This is because parties have the opportunity
to take part in the formation of the arbitration panel and,
consequently, they are guaranteed a higher degree of impartiality and
independence than when they employ panels constituted directly by
the private providers with interests dominated by private
businesses.112 Although, it is clear that the ICANN system is far
from independent, given its bias towards private firms, this bias is
less than in the case of the completely private, privacy rights
forums.113
Given that the general governing rules employed by the
UDRP providers are supplied by ICANN and users do have the
opportunity, although limited, to place representatives on ICANN’s
Board of Directors, these rules could be subject to review in order to
ensure a more fair treatment of non-commercial parties.114
International users participate more in the rules and management of
ICANN than privacy rights providers.115 As a result, more
international cooperation should occur, and the UDRP may achieve a
broader consensus.116 As governments participate in the process, it is
more probable that consumers and other users can exert greater
influence over ICANN’s decisions than the totally private system
that regulates privacy in e-commerce.117

III. UDRP Providers
ICANN has authorized private providers to manage Internet
users’ complaints.118 These providers should follow ICANN’s policy
guidelines, but may complement these rules with their own.119
111. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 44.
112. See http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm.
113. See different points of view and critics detailed in footnote 35.
114. The recent reform of ICANN has drastically reduced the representation of at large groups in the
decision making process of ICANN, increasing the doubts about the legitimacy of the Corporation. See Kesan
and Gallo, supra note 38.
115. “ICANN must be understood as a new international regime formed around a global shared resource.
Its purpose is to define property rights in Internet identifiers and to regulate their consumption and supply. . . .
The emerging Internet governance regime is the product of an informal political agreement among national
governments, and the agreement includes much more extensive role for private sector actors. That fact does
make ICANN different from other international regimes, but it does not change its basic nature. It is much
more accurate and analytically fruitful to define ICANN as a variant of a standard international regime than it
is to think of it as something sui generis.” Mueller, supra note 16, at 217-218.
116. “ICANN’s creation of its own international trademark law is inherently controversial. What right
does a California nonprofit corporation have to create and impose law that differs from the law on nationstates?” Thornburg, supra note 30, at 208.
117. See Kesan and Gallo, supra note 44.
118. See http://www.icann.org
119. See http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm
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Initially, ICANN authorized two providers, the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) and the National Arbitration Forum
(NAF), approved by ICANN on December 1st and 23rd of 1999,
respectively. In 2000, ICANN added two providers, eResolution
(eRes) in January and CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution (CPR) in
May. eRes ceased to operate in November 2001 and a new provider,
Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre, with two offices in
Beijing and Hong Kong, was approved in February 2002.120 In this
work, we will analyze the cases decided by the four initial providers
of UDRP services.
The United Nations created the first of the UDRP providers,
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),121 in 1994 with
the intention of providing mediation services for private parties in
specific areas.122 WIPO, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, was
primarily responsible for creating the UDRP regime. In fact, in April
1999, WIPO produced a final report on the creation of a domain
name resolution system that became the blueprint for ICANN’s own
UDRP.123
Other dispute resolution services such as the NAF, eRes
CPR, and ADNRC emerged after ICANN’s inception. The National
Arbitration Forum (NAF), composed of judges and lawyers from
around the world, was created in 1986 to provide alternative dispute
resolution services to different parties.124 The Center for Public
Resources (CPR), a nonprofit organization consisting of more than
500 private corporations, was formed in 1979 by major corporations
in order to provide alternative dispute resolution forums for private
businesses. 125 Finally, eResolution (eRes), located in Quebec,
120. http://www.adndrc.org/adndrc/index.html (The website of the Asian provider) and
http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-03dec01.htm (The announcement of ICANN creating the
new Asian provider for the UDRP regime).
121. “WIPO is one of the 16 specialized agencies of the United Nations system of organizations. It
administers 23 international treaties dealing with different aspects of intellectual property protection.” At
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/overview.html
“WIPO is an organ of the United Nations with specific duties defined by a series of treaties. Signatory nations
send delegates to WIPO, and meet occasionally in plenary to make decisions. Being responsible to all its
members states rather than just the United States, the WIPO staff felt empowered to define its own terms of
reference and proposed to make recommendations concerning: 1) dispute prevention; 2) dispute resolution; 3)
a process to protect famous and well-known marks in the gTLDs; and 4) the effects on intellectual property
rights of the new gTLDs.” Froomkin, supra note 17, at 624.
122. “Developed by leading experts in cross-border dispute settlement, the procedures offered by the
Center are widely recognized as particularly appropriate for technology, entertainment and other disputes
involving intellectual property.”
123. See Final Report of the First WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, at
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process1/report/index.html. See also Froomkin, supra note 17 (analyzing the
characteristics of the WIPO proposal and the final outcome from ICANN policy).
124. “[T]he Forum’s only mission is to provide superior dispute resolution services to parties seeking an
alternative to litigation.” At, http://www.arbforum.com/. The NAF is located in the United States. Most of
the UDRP cases evaluated by the NAF are from the North American region.
125. “Founded in 1979 as the Center for Public Resources, CPR’s mission is to spearhead innovation and

25

Canada, was formed in 2000. However, eRes suspended its activities
in 2001.
In 2002, ICANN approved the addition of an Asian dispute
resolution provider, Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre
(ADNDRC), with offices in Hong Kong and Beijing.126 ADNDRC is
a combination of the China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and the Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre (HKIAC).127 The CIETAC is the only dispute
resolution provider for the top domain name .cn. Meanwhile,
HKIAC, created in 1985, is an alternative dispute resolution system.
In 200, HKIAC became the sole dispute resolution provider for the
top domain name .hk.128
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROVIDERS
As previously explained, ICANN provides the rules for the
administration of the UDRP. Accordingly, the authorized providers
must follow these rules. There are, however, some differences
between the providers. In this section we analyze the differences
between these providers, focusing on the supplemental rules, fees,
and relative representation afforded by the arbitration panel.
1. Supplemental Rules

Besides the UDRP rules provided by ICANN, private
providers can add rules that do not contradict ICANN policy.129
Most of these additional rules concern general procedures for the
cases evaluated by the provider. Table 1 presents the main
characteristics of the supplemental rules for each provider.

promote excellence in public and private dispute resolution, and to serve as a primary multinational resource
for avoidance, management and resolution of business-related and other disputes.” At,
http://www.cpradr.org/aboutcpr1.htm
126. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
127. See http://www.adndrc.org/adndrc/index.html
128. Id.
129. See http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm
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TABLE 1: SUPPLEMENTAL RULES OF UDRP AUTHORIZED PROVIDERS
WIPO
NAF
CPR
Submission
Requirements

Cover sheet and copies to
Registrar(s) and Respondent

Compliance
Review

Center has 5 days to review

Official
Administering
the Case
Panel
Appointment

Center appoints Case
Administrator

Recusation of
Panelists
Respondent
Default
Limits to
Submission

Extension for
Response

Additional
Submissions

Coversheet plus 3 copies (single
panel) or 5 copies (Three Member
Panel)

ERES

5 Copies

Three parts: Complaint proper,
Annexes and Cover Sheet

Left to the Panel
without a specific
requirement

Clerk has 10 days to review and
Complainant has 5 days to correct
any deficiency.
Clerk’s Office

Three Member Panel: Parties
should provide list of 3
candidates, ordered by
preference. The third panelist
appointed is the president.
Parties can agree on naming
the president.
Not Mentioned

Single Member Panel: Appointed
by the Forum
Three Member Panel: Chair elected
by the Provider and not part of the
Parties’ list of candidates.

Not mentioned

Not Mentioned

Not Mentioned

Single Member Panel: Appointed
by the Clerk’s Office
Three Member Panel: Appointed
by Provider: One panelist from the
lists of each party and the third
appointed by the Provider
(President).
Decided by the Clerk’s Office

Panel should be appointed by
the Center.

Panel appointed by the Center.
Option to change to a one member
panel should be provided.
Complaint and Response no longer
than 10 pages total

Not Mentioned

Panel Appointed by Provider

Complaint and
Response not to
exceed 10 pages
plus annexes and
exhibits.
Not Mentioned

Not mentioned

Word limit: Paragraph
3(b)(ix) 5000 words
5(b)(i) 5000 words
15(e) no word limit

Could be extended by the Panel
Extension can be given subject to:
Parties agreement, notice to the
Forum, state exceptional
circumstances, state extension (no
more than 20 days) and pay
extension fee of $100. Forum will
decide on the extension.
Not Mentioned
Within 5 days of submission of the
Not Mentioned
Not Mentioned
Response and it should be
accompanied by a fee of $250.
Source: Own Elaboration based in: http://www.udrpinfo.com/eres/supprules.htm,
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/background/index.html, http://www.arbforum.com/domains/UDRP/rules.asp,
http://www.cpradr.org/ICANN_RulesAndFees.htm.
Not mentioned
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Even though the differences in the supplementary rules are
minimal, and most of them are related to the format and timing of the
submissions of information and evidence to the panel, the effects of
such differences in procedure could have important consequences on
the efficiency and results of the procedure.130 Some of the providers,
such as WIPO131 and eRes,132 have a more complex system of
procedure than others such as NAF133 and CPR. For example, CPR’s
rules are minimal and most of the decisions are left to the panel to
decide what is best. In fact, because it is the only provider that
charges for extra submissions and time extensions, NAF is the only
provider that offers incentives to minimize information submissions
and time. These fees could, however, be a problem for parties
attempting to submit new evidence or information regarding a
case.134 Nonetheless, the general fee for NAF is lower than the other
providers, and the extra fees are much smaller. Beyond these small
differences, most of the rules are similar for all of the providers
(Table 1).
2. Fees

Fees are another way of distinguishing providers. Given that
the rules are applied uniformly across providers, differences among
the fees that providers charge can induce complainants to switch
from one provider to another. Table 2 shows the schedule of fees
charged by each provider.

130. See Section IV.1 (analyzing the results of cases handled by the same panelists in different
providers).
131. “The WIPO/AMC Supplemental Rules include very few changes to ICANN’s Rules. The
Supplemental Rules do, however, provide for cases to be filed through the Center’s “Internet based case filing
and administration system”.” Stacey King, The “Law That It Deems Applicable”: ICANN, Dispute Resolution,
and the Problem of Cybersquatting, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 453, 476-477 (2000).
132. “eResolution’s Supplemental Rules include twenty-one definitions. These include the definitions set
out in the Rules, as well as adding a number of additional definitions. None of the definitions however,
significantly changes the process or procedures. They simply act to clarify certain terms.” Id. at 478-479.
133. “Like the WIPO/AMC, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) has adopted the definitions set forth
in the Rules without supplementing them.” Id. at 481.
134. “The NAF “sandbag” rule is one of the most pernicious examples of a provider’s attempt to
distinguish itself as plaintiff-friendly. A rule that allows a party to pay to put in a surprise pleading, perhaps
with new factual allegations or even a new case in chief, is not a rule calculated to achieve justice.” Froomkin,
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TABLE 2: FEES CHARGED BY PROVIDERS
No. Domain Names
1
2
3-5
6-10
11-15
16 or more
No. Domain Names
1-5
6-10
More than 10
No. Domain Names
1-2
3-5
More than 6

NAF
Single Panel
$1,150
$1,300
$1,400
$1,750
$2,000
To be Determined
WIPO
Single Panel
$1,500
$2,000
To be Determined
CPR
Single Panel
$2,000
$2,500
To be Determined

Three Member Panel
$2,500
$2,600
$2,800
$3,500
$4,000
To be Determined
Three Member Panel
$4,000
$5,000
To be Determined
Three Member Panel
$4,500
$6,000
To be Determined

Source: http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/, http://www.arbforum.com/domains/,
http://www.cpradr.org/ICANN_Menu.htm,

supra note 17, at 703.
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There are two main characteristics of Table 2. First, the cost
of the procedure across providers is not prohibitive. In fact, the cost
is much lower than the expected costs of resorting to court action to
resolve the conflict.135 Second, the differences in prices among
providers are not big enough to promote a high substitution effect
among providers. For example, the most popular provider is WIPO,
which charges a higher fee than NAF, the second most popular
provider. WIPO’s fees average 16% more than NAF’s for those
cases where the number of domain names is between one and five.
For the cases between six and ten domain names, the difference is
just 14% among these two providers. CPR has a 24% higher cost that
NAF for cases involving one to five domain names. Accordingly,
these figures suggest that the system is providing affordable dispute
resolution services without producing a high level of competition
among providers.
3. Geographical Representation of Arbitrators

The type of panelists offered to complainants and respondents
is the third main variable the providers must manage. In most
instances, panelists are usually former judges or lawyers from
Consequently, the panelists’ different
different countries.136
backgrounds could have an influence over the final results of their
verdicts. This is a very important issue on the Internet, where people
from different parts of the world do business. As a result, a common
set of rules for every user of the Internet should take into account the
diversity of the panelists offered by each provider. Of equal
importance is that those countries with higher levels of connectivity
to the Internet should receive a greater share of the panelists. Table 3
shows the distributions of panelists for each provider across
countries.

135. “[E]ven though the DRP’s fees have already increased by at least 50% in the short time the policy
has been in operation, it is still regarded as a bargain by trademark holders.” Thornburg, supra note 30, at 204.
136. See, http://www.udrpinfo.com/panl.php (providing information and profiles of the panelists of the
UDRP system).
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TABLE 3: PANELISTS
WIPO

NAF

Argentina

4

2

Australia

19

1

Austria

2

Belgium
Brazil

CPR

INTERNET USERS

PANELISTS (% OF TOTAL)
WIPO
NAF
CPR

(% World Total)
0.66

1.2

1.4

1.44

5.8

0.7

1

0.52

0.6

0.7

5

1

0.64

1.5

0.7

8

3

1.60

2.4

2.2

Canada

21

7

2.69

6.4

5.0

2.7

Chile

5

0.62

1.5

China

2

2

6.72

0.6

1.4

2.7

Colombia

2

3

0.23

0.6

2.2

Croatia

1

0.05

0.3

Cyprus

1

0.03

0.3

Czech Republic

3

0.28

0.9

Denmark

2

1

0.58

0.6

0.7

Ecuador

1

1

0.07

0.3

0.7

Egypt

3

0.12

0.9

Finland

1

France

17

Germany

1

1
1

0.45

0.3

3.12

5.2

9

6.14

2.8

Ghana

1

0.01

0.3

Greece

2

0.28

0.6

Hungary

2

1

0.30

0.6

0.7

India

6

2

1.40

1.8

1.4

Ireland

2

2

0.18

0.6

1.4

Israel

5

2

0.36

1.5

1.4

Italy

10

2

3.27

3.1

1.4

Jamaica

2

0.02

0.6

Japan

8

2.4

Liechtenstein

2

1

1

11.15

1

0.00

1.4

0.7
0.7

Malaysia

2

1

1.30

0.6

0.7

Mexico

6

2

0.72

1.8

1.4

Netherlands

6

1.58

1.8

New Zealand

6

0.22

1.8

Nigeria

1

0.02

0.3

Norway

4

0.54

1.2

Pakistan

1

0.10

0.3

1

Paraguay

1

0.01

Puerto Rico

1

0.12

Portugal

3

Republic of
Korea
Romania

9
1

Singapore

6

0.7

0.7
0.7

0.50

0.9

4.86

2.8

0.20

0.3

0.30

1.8

5

31

2.7

3.6

2.7

South Africa

2

1

Spain

10

3

Sweden

6

Switzerland
Uganda

0.61

0.6

0.7

1.47

3.1

2.2

2

0.92

1.8

1.4

14

2

0.44

4.3

1.4

1

1

0.01

0.3

0.7

UK

28

2

4.79

8.6

1.4

US

93

85

28.48

28.4

61.2

Vietnam
Zimbabwe
TOTAL

3

30

1

0.20

1
327

0.02
139

8.1

81.1

0.7
0.3
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Source: http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/, http://www.arbforum.com/domains/,
http://www.cpradr.org/ICANN_Menu.htm, World Bank Country Indicators, at
http://www.worldbank.org/

Although there are important differences between providers,
WIPO has a more diverse group of panelists from both developed
and less-developed countries.137 The most favored countries in
WIPO are Australia, Canada, France, Spain, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom. These countries account for 33.4% of the panelists
and only 13.95% of Internet users. The least represented OECD
member countries are Japan, Germany, and Korea. These countries
account for 8% of the panelists and 22.5% of Internet users. The
United States’ representation in the group of panelists is almost equal
to the share of U.S. Internet users.
WIPO is the most diversified of the UDRP providers. This is
possibly due to the relationship WIPO has with the United Nations
and WIPO’s need for worldwide representation.138 Nevertheless,
Asia, especially East Asia, receives unfavorable treatment with
respect to the choice of panelists.139 This region accounts for 26% of
total Internet users, but their representation is just 10% (WIPO), 8%
(NAF), and 2.4% (CPR). This bias may explain the creation of new
UDRP providers for the East Asian region in 2002.140 In the next
section we explore the effects panelists and specific country cases
have on the providers’ performance.

137. Even though countries from the OECD represent 87% of the total panelists and account for 75% of
Internet users in the World.
138
.
On the other hand, in both CPR and NAF, the United States is heavily represented, having most of
the panelists in the list of both providers.
139. This region includes the following countries: India, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, China (including
Hong Kong), and Republic of Korea.
140. See supra note 117.
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IV. Empirical Evidence
The development of the UDRP system has drawn the
attention of many researchers since the regime’s inception in 1999.141
The creation of a global dispute resolution system that covered all
gTLDs domain names was an ambitious task undertaken in a
basically unregulated environment.142 Up until now, however, most
of the studies about ICANN UDRP are devoted to the theoretical
debate of the virtues and failures of the system in providing effective
regulation of Domain Names complaints.143
Although there are few works designed to evaluate
performance of the UDRP with exhaustive empirical analysis,
Professor Milton Mueller at Syracuse University undertook one of
the first empirical attempts to understand UDRP.144 Professor
Mueller constructed a database with most of the data concerning the
cases evaluated through the ICANN UDRP regime.145 His first
empirical work was an attempt to describe the performance of the
system and explain the differences in providers’ market shares.146
The work provided useful empirical information on the
characteristics of the providers and the performance of both the
system as a whole and individual private providers.
Professor Mueller determined that a bias existed in the
system because the providers that favored complainants were also
the ones that received the higher market share.147 WIPO and NAF
received 61% and 31% of the cases respectively, having a winning
rate for complainants of 67.5% and 71.5% respectively.148 On the
other hand, eRes, which was seen as being more lenient with
respondents, had a market share of just 7% with a winning rate
percentage for complainants of just 44.2%.149 The winning rate for
complainants was very high in those cases where the respondent

141. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
142. “All in all, about 70% of the world’s domain name registrations now fall under the jurisdiction of
the UDRP. The percentage will probably increase in the future as new top-level domains are introduced by
ICANN.” Milton Mueller, Rough Justice. An Analysis of ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy.
Convergence Center, Syracuse University School of Information Studies.
143. See supra note 35.
144. See supra note 137, and Milton Mueller, Success by Default, A New Profile of Domain Name
Trademark Disputes under ICANN’s UDRP, Convergence Center, Syracuse University, June 2002.
145. To access the database see, http://dcc.syr.edu/markle/mhome.htm
146. See Mueller, supra note 142.
147. “There is statistical evidence that selection of dispute resolution service providers by challengers
leads to forum shopping that biases the results.” Id. at 2.
148. Id. at 11-14.
149. Id.
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defaulted, thus providing an explanation for the differences in
complainant winning rates among providers.150
Professor Mueller’s work also presents an econometric
analysis of the cases. The conclusions of the analysis are that the
market shares that the NAF and WIPO receive depend on their
influence over the U.S. and rest of the world.151 Furthermore, the
system is biased towards the complainants and eRes’s low market
share is due to the fact that its resolutions favor respondents.152 The
author also proposed some changes in the system in order to avoid
forum shopping.153 Nonetheless, an INTA report criticized the
results of this research effort.154 This report notes flaws in Professor
Mueller’s analysis including: (1) misunderstandings in the
functioning of UDRP; (2) inappropriate statistical evidence to
support the claims of bias; (3) inadequate review of UDRP cases; (4)
lack of analysis and data showing the rate of challenges to UDRP
decisions; (5) the fact that disputed domain names are a small
percentage of total domain names; and (6) the UDRP effect of
discouraging registrations that infringe domain names.155
Professor Michael Geist provides another major piece of
empirical evidence on the ICANN UDRP system.156 He based his
work on the analysis of the general data from UDRP cases.
Professor Geist’s conclusions are similar to Professor Mueller’s,
finding evidence of bias and forum shopping among providers.
Furthermore, Geist suggests that panel performance is quite different
when separated into one member and three-member panels.157
150. “The high default rate can be interpreted in two opposing ways. Either the UDRP procedure moves
too fast for ordinary domain name registrants to receive notice or to defend themselves adequately, or many of
the challenged names were abandoned by registrants, who saw little point in defending them. We tend toward
the latter interpretation, without ruling out the possibility that a significant minority of cases fall into the
former category. We found a small number of cases with late responses, but many panelists accepted the late
submissions or delayed the proceedings to obtain a response.” Id. at 12. When the respondent contested the
complaint, the winning percentage for the complainant was 43% eRes, 50% NAF, and 54% WIPO. Id. at 12.
151. For eRes, the market share was determined by the high complainant loss rate. Id. at 18.
152. Id.
153. “To remedy the bias inherent in complainant forum shopping, ICANN should modify the UDRP to
allow domain name registrars to select the dispute resolution provider(s) who will handle disputes over names
they register. The incentives of registrars are more balanced because end users have a choice of which registrar
to use. Registrar selection compares favorably to other possible remedies, such as random assignment of cases
to dispute resolution service providers, an appeal process, or modification of the language of the policy.” Id. at
2.
154. Ned Branthover, UDRP – A Success Story: A Rebuttal to the Analysis and Conclusions of Professor
Milton Mueller in “Rough Justice, International Trademark Association (INTA) Internet Committee, May,
2002.
155. Id. at 1-2.
156. Michael Geist, supra note 35 and Michael Geist, Fundamentally Fair.com? An Update on Bias
Allegations and the ICANN UDRP, University of Ottawa, at http://www.lawbytes.ca
157. “At least three factors contribute to the greater confidence in the three-person panel. First, this panel
configuration eliminates the possibility that a single panelist may simply misinterpret the UDRP and render the
wrong decision. Second, the three-person panel forces panelists to more carefully consider their decision by
justifying it before their counterparts on the panel. . . . Third, and most importantly, the three-member panel
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Geist’s work suggests that three-member panels offer a lower
winning rate for complainants: 62% (WIPO), 49%(NAF), and 50%
(eRes) for three-member panels versus 83% (WIPO), 86%(NAF),
and 64%(eRes) for single member panels.158 Accordingly, Geist
suggests that straightforward changes to a mandatory three-member
panel regime will reduce system bias.159
The INTA has also criticized Geist’s work.160 The INTA’s
critical review suggests that Professor Geist’s work: (1) was nothing
more than a simple statistical analysis of the cases without
adequately measuring for fairness; (2) did not consider the default
cases in the calculation of the winning percentage for complainants;
(3) did not analyze other causes that could justify high winning
percentage ratio; and (4) did not consider that forum selection can be
the result of other factors such as quality and reputation, costs, etc,
rather than bias.161 Although, both Geist and Muller asserted that the
UDRP was created to solve the problem of abusive registration and
that a higher winning rate for complainants than for respondents
should be the expected norm, both INTA reports criticized Geist and
Muller’s assumption that a 50% winning rate for complainants and
respondents is normal.162
Dr. Annette Kur of the Max-Plank-Institute completed the last
major piece of empirical work on ICANN.163 Kur presented an
excellent empirical description of the performance of the UDRP
system that considered the most disparate variables and
characteristics of the panels’ decisions. The main conclusion of
completely alters the panelist selection process. In a single panel case, the arbitration provider is exclusively
responsible for allocating the case to a panelist. Conversely, in a three member panel, the arbitration provider
wields comparatively little influence over the selection process. Both the complainant and respondent are
typically allowed to select one of the three panel members by submitting a list of three or five acceptable
candidates of which the provider will select one. The provider selects the third member of the panel, but only
after it has provided both the complainant and respondent with the opportunity to indicate which panelist they
prefer.” Geist, supra note 33, at 22.
158. Id. at 19.
159. “Rather than focusing on provider selection as a means of solving the forum shopping issue, ICANN
must turn its attention to panelist selection. If providers continue to maintain exclusive and unchecked
authority over the selection of panelists in 90% of all the cases, no reform of the rules nor to (of?) how a
provider is selected will remove the potential for bias in panelist allocation.” Id., at 28.
160. INTA, The UDRP by All Accounts Works Effectively. Rebuttal to Analysis and Conclusions of
Professor Michael Geist in “Fair.com?” and “Fundamentally Fair.com?” International Trademark
Association, INTA Internet Committee, May 2002.
161. Id. at 2.
162. “At one point in Fair.com, Professor Geist asserts that “only one panelist had a respondent winning
percentage under 50%”. The use of the word “only” and the use of 50% as a point of reference suggest that
Professor Geist is treating 50% as “the norm”. However, 50% is not a norm for litigation; 50% is a norm for
probability.” Id. at 3.
163. Annette Kur, UDRP, Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and
Competition Law, Munich and Institute for Intellectual Property Law and Market Law, University of
Stockholm,
Institute
for
Information
Law,
Technical
University
of
Karlsruhe,
at
http://www.intellecprop.mpg.de/Online-Publikationen/2002/UDRP-study-final-02.pdf.
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Kur’s work is: “[g]enerally speaking, the survey shows that fears
concerning the risk that the policy might be misused by large
companies in order to freeze competition and free speech are largely
unfounded. [A]lthough UDRP is functioning well as a matter of
principle, there are certain points where the picture becomes
somewhat unclear.”164
Most of the current debate centers on the assumption that
providers’ bias towards complainants is the main variable that
matters in explaining user and provider behavior.165 Although bias is
important, provider performance can be more important in
determining the users’ choice of provider. In this respect, our work
offers a richer empirical analysis, looking at the different factors that
explain the performance of the UDRP. Furthermore, there are other
variables, such as providers’ efficiency, that help to explain the
selection process better than the argued bias toward complainants.
The aim of this work is to re-evaluate the claims of the main
empirical work in this area and to provide a more accurate
explanation of UDRP performance.

V. Econometric Model
ICANN strictly controls the UDRP with guidelines and rules.
As a result, the system has a common policy that should normalize
the decisions and performance of private courts. Given that ICANN
fixes the general rules, the other two main variables that can affect
the performance of the system are the price charged in each case and
the speed of the procedure.166 The duration of each case is the only
variable each provider can use to differentiate from the other
providers. In fact, the duration of the trial is one of the main factors
for the UDRP’s existence.167
The creation of a cheap and fast procedure for conflict
resolution was one of ICANN’s main objectives. The duration of the
trial will depend on the specific technology each provider uses to
decide cases. In general, both complainants and defendants prefer a
164. Id. at 57-58.
165. See supra note 35.
166
.Prices charged by each provider are not different enough to generate a bias favoring any of the
providers. Also, there is no evidence of systemic price competition.
167. “The UDRP also succeeds in being a process that resolves disputes quickly. Most of the cases are
disposed of within the allotted times, which are themselves very short. The ability to transmit information
electronically undoubtedly adds to the speed of the process. While the process achieves speed by allowing very
little input and by limiting the issues involved, it must be said that speed was the drafters’ primary goal and it
was successfully accomplished. Note, however, that this speed is far more likely to benefit the complainant
than the respondent.” Thornburg, supra note 30, at 204-205.
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faster system because both providers have a uniform and
independent review system.168 The duration of the trial will depend
on the general characteristics of each provider, as well as the
characteristics of the case presented. In this section we explore some
regression models to determine the characteristics of the UDRP
system as a whole, and of each provider.
A. ARE COMPLAINANTS SELECTING PROVIDERS BY BIAS OR
EFFICIENCY?
Most empirical analyses of the UDRP have focused on
analyzing the cases for each provider and the differences among
them. Some of the most complete empirical works are by Geist
(2001), Mueller (2001), and Kur (2002).169 Mueller (2001) contends
that the UDRP is biased in favor of the private firms most of the
time. The fact that the only provider that had favored consumers and
individuals lost market share and went bankrupt is strong evidence in
support of the bias claims.170 Kur’s study also described the
performance of the UDRP in terms of the results from the cases
presented. These studies do, however, show only part of the
empirical evidence, and their analysis is mostly based on descriptive
statistics.
The International Trademark Association (INTA)
criticized Geist and Muller’s works for the use of simple statistics
and the lack of a qualitative analysis.171 In short, the main critiques
of these studies are their reliance on ex-post analysis, looking at the
results of the UDRP and analyzing the presence of bias favoring
complainants.
Geist and Muller’s analyses are based on simple statistics that
describe the results of the model. The analyses lack a clear model
testing the authors’ thesis. In this paper, we will look at an important
measure of efficiency, as we will try to understand the technology
168. See, Froomkin, supra note 17, at 675 (discussing the problem of allowing short time for the case of
small firms and consumer responses).
169. They present evidence on the differences in treatment of private firms and individuals in the UDRP
regime. See Mueller, supra note 135, Geist, supra note 35 and Kur, Annette, UDRP, supra note 162.
170. See Section III.
“The Fair.com study concluded by arguing that there was compelling evidence that forum shopping has
become an integral part of the UDRP and that the system may indeed be biased in favor of trademark holders[
]. In the seven months since the release of that study, evidence to that effect has continued to mount, while the
explanations of UDRP supporters have been proven incorrect. With eResolution now in bankruptcy court,
NAF granting an ever-larger share of its caseload to a small group of panelists, and the red herring of defaults
vs. non-defaults conclusively disproved, the need for ICANN UDRP reform has become increasingly urgent.”
Geist, supra note 35, at 8-9.
“Moreover, the fact that eResolutions is now in bankruptcy may have been due to a number of factors wholly
unrelated to alleged forum shopping.” International Trademark Association, supra note 159 at 7.
171. INTA Internet Committee, supra notes 153 and 159.
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behind each of these providers. This analysis, based on econometric
techniques, will provide better tools for determining the actual
functioning of the UDRP system. Although we will examine some of
the questions posed by these empirical studies, we will also examine
the productivity conditions of each provider. The providers’
performance is an overlooked part of most of the UDRP studies that
are based on an ex-post analysis of the results.
Most studies point to the high ratio of cases in which
complainants win as an indicator of the bias of the system.
Furthermore, the studies predict that the higher ratio of complainants
winning cases will induce future complainants to forum shop and
select those providers with a higher winning percentage.
Nonetheless, these studies do not assert what should be a fair ratio of
complainants winning cases. More importantly, there was no testing
of the choices complainants faced at the moment of selecting the
provider. In this section, we intend to develop an ex-ante model,
explaining complainants’ behavior at the moment of selecting the
provider. We assume that the price variable is not significant in
selecting the provider.
Complainants have two main motivations for choosing a
provider. First, complainants can choose a provider based on the
bias favoring the complainants. This has been the main argument for
those analyzing the UDRP system. Second, complainants are also
willing to choose the provider that is most efficient at handling the
case and generating a shorter waiting time.172 We assume that each
complainant (or consumer) who has a complaint will pick a provider
j from a set of J providers at time i and the utility derived from this
choice is given by a random utility model,

U ij =

'

z ij +

(1)

ij

Where Uij is the utility of complainant i for choosing provider j, and
i=1,...,n and j=1,. . .,m;
‘ is a vector of the coefficient for the vector of explanatory
variables zij for each consumer; and ij is an error term.
According to equation 1, if the complainant makes the choice
j, we assume that Uij is the maximum among the possible utilities
derived from the rest of the providers in the set J. As a result, the
172. This is an efficiency motive for choosing providers, which has been neglected in the literature about
the UDRP.
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statistical model is driven by the probability that choice j is made,
which is,
Pr ob(U ij > U ik )

for all other k

j

(2)

Accordingly, given a random variable that represents the
choice made by complainants, Yi, then the probability can be
expressed as,
'z
e ij
Pr ob(Yi = j ) = J
(3)
' zij
e
j =1

This model is the conditional logit model. In our case, the
dependent variable Yij is given by the selection of each complainant
in the UDRP system. The providers are NAF, WIPO, and eRes, i.e.
J=3. The explanatory variables that determine the probability that a
given utility under a given provider is bigger than the utility of any
of the others are: (1) the two main characteristics of each providers;
(2) the bias favoring complainants; (3) represented by the ratio of
cases that have been decided in the favor of complainants by each
provider; and (4) the efficiency of each provider, measured by the
average duration of the cases managed by each provider. In
accordance with this model, we are evaluating the probability of each
complainant choosing a provider based on these measures of the
performance of the providers. This model is more suitable for
analyzing the causes of the preference for some providers with
respect to others instead of simply looking at the ex-post results of
the system and elaborating a suitable explanation for those results.
We have calculated a complete series of different indicators
for the bias and the efficiency measures. First, for measuring bias we
have the following variables. Complaint is the ratio of cases won by
the complainants to cases brought by complainants since the
beginning of the provider’s operations and up to the day the
complainant presents the case to a provider.173 Monthly Complaint is
the measure of cases won by the complainants in the current month
the complaint is being presented. Monthly Complaint Lagged is the
same measure as Monthly Complaint, but lagged one month.
Duration is the natural logarithm of the average duration of the cases
for each provider since the beginning of the operations of the

173.

Complaint is calculated in a daily basis from January 2000 to November 2002.
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provider.174 Monthly Duration is the natural logarithm of the average
duration of the cases for each provider in the current month the case
is being presented to a provider. Monthly Duration Lagged is the
same measure as Monthly Duration, but lagged one month.
Our analysis focuses on testing whether the probability of
selecting one of the providers depends on the complainant bias or on
the provider’s efficiency in handling the cases. In order to be sure of
the relationship between the election of provider and these variables,
we tested a series of similar models using the variables mentioned
previously.175 The dependent variable, Provider, represents the
selection of the provider made by each claimant. Table 4 lists the
results of our regression models. According to this model, the
explanatory variables we considered for the provider selection are:
(1) the ratio of complainants winning the cases for each provider
during the current month in which the complainant was presented
(Cmnaf, Cmwipo and Cmeres); (2) the lagged variables (Cmnafl,
Cmwipol and Cmeresl); (3) the natural logarithm of the average
duration of the cases in each provider to include the current month
(Ldnaf, Ldwipo and Lderes); and (4) the lagged variables (Ldnafl,
Ldwipol and Lderesl). The results suggest that only the complainant
and variables for WIPO and eRes lagged one month. The variables
for NAF and eRes for the current month are significant and the
lagged monthly duration for WIPO is significant. Now, we would
like to see the magnitude of the impact of each variable in the
probability of selection. Table 5 shows the probabilities calculated
by the model and the effects of changing each of the explanatory
variables in one deviation standard.

174.
175.

Duration is calculated daily from January 2000 to November 2003.
See Appendix A for the summary of the variables used in the regression analysis.
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TABLE 4: MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION
Variables

MODEL 1
Coefficient
NAF
1.956

Cmeresl

(0.649)

Cmwipol

(2.113)

6.879
-8.014
Ldnaf

(2.370)

Ldwipol

(0.598)

Lderes

(0.723)

3.953
4.001

Z

3.013(***)
3.256(**)
-3.382(***)
6.605(***)
5.537(***)

-6.190
Constant

-0.746

(8.296)

WIPO
2.463
Cmeresl

(0.621)

Cmwipol

(2.024)

3.994
-6.967

3.968(***)
1.973(**)
-3.017(***)

Ldnaf

(2.309)

Ldwipol

(0.579)

8.644(***)

3.879

5.433(***)

5.009
Lderes

(0.714)

-11.200
Cons

(8.081)

Number of observations=2861 LR chi2(10)=121.78 Prob > chi2=0.0000
Log Likelihood= -2255.66 Pseudo R2= 0.0238
Coefficient tests: (***) Significant 1%; (**) Significant 5%; (*) Significant 10%
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-1.386

TABLE 5: PROBABILITIES MODEL 1
Prob (NAF)

% Change

Prob (WIPO)

% Change

Prob (eRes)

0.268

Cmeresl

Increase

0.254

-5.22%

0.716

4.5%

0.030

-36.2%

Decrease

0.280

4.5%

0.650

-5.1%

0.071

51.1%

Increase

0.304

13.4%

0.660

-3.64%

0.036

-23.4%

Decrease

0.166

-38.1%

0.791

15.5%

0.043

-8.5%

Increase

0.221

-17.5%

0.658

-3.9%

0.121

157.4%

Decrease

0.307

14.6%

0.676

-5.5%

0.016

-66.0%

Ldwipol

Increase

0.238

-11.2%

0.741

8.1%

0.020

-57%

Decrease

0.288

7.4%

0.608

-11.2%

0.103

120%

Lderes

Increase

0.281

4.9%

0.699

2.0%

0.019

-60.0%

Decrease

0.246

-8.2%

0.647

-5.5%

0.108

129.8%

Cmwipol
Ldnafl

0.685

% Change

TOTAL PROBABILITY

0.047

The above results suggest that there is a much higher
probability of the complainants selecting WIPO compared to NAF
and eRes. This is true for at least the period of time covered by this
study, including the period when eRes was still receiving cases. For
NAF, column 1 in Table 5, the probability of being selected is
26.8%. An increase (decrease) in the ratio of complainants winning
in eRes will slightly increase (decrease) the probability of
complainants selecting NAF. Even though the impact is small, it is
in the opposite direction. One would expect that if there is a bias, an
increase in the winning ratio of complainants in eRes should
decrease the probability of receiving a case for NAF and WIPO. In
our study, the findings suggest that an increase in the bias favoring
complainants by eRes will produce an increase in the number of
complainants presented to NAF. The same result is true for NAF in
the case of a change in the complainant winning ratio for WIPO. In
this instance, an increase/decrease will result in an important
increase/decrease in the probability of cases received by NAF.
Again, these results are counterintuitive to the thesis presented
before.
An increase (decrease) in the duration of NAF procedure will
decrease (increase) the probability of NAF receiving the next case.
The effect of this variable is more important than the effect of the
bias variables. More importantly, the effect is as expected, i.e., a
worsening in the efficiency of NAF should decrease the probability
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of receiving the next claim. For eRes, the changes are also as
expected. A higher/lower duration in eRes produces a higher/lower
probability of selection in NAF, thus increasing/decreasing the
probability of receiving a claim. Nonetheless, in the case of the
duration variable for WIPO, the results are counterintuitive. An
increase/decrease in the duration for WIPO will produce a
decrease/increase in the probability of receiving a case in NAF.
WIPO has the highest probability of being selected, 68.5%.
In this case, an increase/decrease in the complainant ratio in eRes
will produce a slightly negative/positive effect on the probability of
WIPO being chosen.176 The same result is observed with the changes
in the complainant ratio in WIPO.177 Accordingly, all of the results
in testing for bias in WIPO contradict the claim of the existence of
such a bias. The duration results suggest that both an increase and a
decrease in the duration of NAF will produce a negative impact on
the WIPO’s probability of receiving cases. Nonetheless, the negative
effect is more important when the duration of NAF procedure
decreases. This is consistent with the efficiency argument. In fact,
the effect of its own duration is not consistent with what we should
expect. An increase (decrease) in the duration of WIPO will
increase/decrease the probability of receiving the next case.
The duration of eRes has the expected effect on the
probability of WIPO. The probability of eRes receiving a case is the
lowest of the three providers studied. An increase/decrease in the
complainant bias by eRes has a negative/positive effect on the
probability of receiving the next case, which is again,
counterintuitive. However, WIPO’s bias variable has both an
increase and a decrease in its variable, thus generating a negative
effect in the probability of eRes. An increase in WIPO’s bias is more
in line with what we should expect.
The impact of the efficiency variable in eRes is very
important. An increase/decrease in the duration of NAF generates an
important increase in the probability of eRes being chosen. Thus,
eRes’s efficiency results are as expected. However, the results are
not as expected in the case of the efficiency measurement for WIPO.
Table 6 shows the expected and actual signs of the results
obtained in our model. The results illustrate that bias variables
produced partial results, with just one instance where the signs
completely match those expected. However, in analyzing efficiency
variables, the results are as expected in all the cases for NAF and
176.
177.

This is again a result contrary to what should be expected.
These have a negative impact in WIPO probability.
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eRes. The only variable that is not according to what we expected is
the efficiency measurement for WIPO. The performance of the
providers can be considered a better measure in determining the
selection of the providers by the complainants than the supposed bias
of the system favoring complaints. Accordingly, in contrast to most
of the empirical papers about the UDRP system based on general
results and supporting the bias theory, our paper examines the
performance of the providers and how differences among them affect
the UDRP results. In actuality, because performance is an important
determinant of provider success, performance should receive more
attention than the supposed system bias.
TABLE 6: EXPECTED AND ACTUAL RESULTS
Variables

NAF
Expected

Cmeresl

Cmwipol

Ldnafl

Ldwipol

Lderes

WIPO

Actual

Expected

ERes

Actual

Expected

Increase

-

(-)

-

+

+

-

Decrease

+

(+)

+

-

-

+

Increase

-

+

+

-

-

(-)

Decrease

+

-

-

+

+

-

Increase

-

(-)

+

(-)

+

(+)

Decrease

+

(+)

-

-

-

(-)

Increase

+

-

-

+

+

-

Decrease

-

+

+

-

-

+

Increase

+

(+)

+

(+)

-

(-)

Decrease

-

(-)

-

(-)

+

(+)

B. HOW IMPORTANT IS EFFICIENCY FOR ANALYZING PROVIDER
PERFORMANCE?

According to the analysis from the previous section, each
provider for the UDRP system has to evaluate and decide on each
complainant.178 The two main characteristics of this alternative
dispute resolution system are low cost and quick results. The low
cost of presenting a complaint is relatively uniform across providers.
ICANN attempted to generate a simple set of rules for processing

178.

Actual

See Sections II and III.
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each complaint designed to create a shortened administrative
process. By providing common rules for the process, ICANN sought
to avoid both excessive differentiation among providers as well as
forum shopping. Despite these efforts, the providers can still find
ways to attract more complainants than their competitors. First,
given that it is the complainant who chooses the provider, a bias
favoring complainants would help attract complaints toward this
provider. This effect has been widely analyzed in literature but, as
illustrated in the previous sections, is not the main determinant used
by complainants in selecting a provider. Second, providers can
increase business by shaping their supplemental rules to be more
efficient than those of other providers. Supplemental rules do not
vary much among providers. Third, although prices are similar
among providers, competitive prices could attract more
complainants. This effect is similar to other oligopolistic industries
where producers do not compete with prices but with customer
service.
Most of these variables will determine the speed of the
process, which in the end is one of the main characteristics of the
system and related to the success of the provider in the long run. The
time that it takes to evaluate and decide each complaint depends on a
number of instruments the provider has on hand.
First, bias for or against some group will alter the process,
and therefore, also affect timing. For example, if a given provider
favors people from a given country, then all the complaints or
responses coming from this country will be treated differently and, as
a consequence, will be resolved at a different speed.
Second, differences in the supplemental rules, and/or internal
procedure for each provider will determine the capacity of a certain
provider to review the complaints efficiently. For example, if a
provider has created simple rules with good incentives for both
complainants and respondents to submit accurate and on time
information, then the resolutions of the cases will be faster.
Third, the type of complaints and procedure will have an
impact on the speed of the process. For example, if the respondent
fails to submit a defense for its case, the panelist will then be in a
position to reach a faster decision.
Fourth, the panelists the provider appoints and their specific
background and precedence will have an impact on the speed of the
results.
For example, a panelist from India will be more
knowledgeable about property laws in India and better equipped to
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quickly handle a case involving parties from India than a case with
parties coming from the European Union.
Fifth, the geographical origin of the parties should have an
impact on the speed of the resolution of the conflict. Differences in
law, language, customs, etc. will be a barrier to a smooth and fast
resolution in each case. This is one of the main barriers a universal
system like the UDRP has to be able to overcome in order to be
successful in the long run. As a result, the duration of the procedure
will be influenced by the many instruments each provider has
available to improve their efficiency and share of cases. Accordingly,
we can represent the speed of the procedure as,
d = D( Bias, Rules, Type, Panelists, Parties )
where:

(4)

Bias is the specific preference the provider has with respect to some
specific group. Rules are the differences in the procedure and rules
of each provider. Type is the type and complexity of each complaint.
Panelists represent individual characteristics of each panelist.
Parties represent the precedence of each party
In the previous equation, the duration of the procedure will
depend on the series of variables under the control of the provider.
The analysis of this duration function will help to determine the
differences between providers and the different factors that explain
the performance of the UDRP system. Accordingly, our analysis
departs from most of the empirical studies of the UDRP. Although
other studies have attempted to determine the bias of the system in
favor of complainants and the general characteristics of the
providers, our analysis goes a step beyond that and examines the
determinants of the duration of the process.
We use duration models to test the performance of each
provider and the system as a whole. Duration models are widely
used in medicine and labor economics to measure the expected
length of an event. In labor economics, researchers have measured
the expected duration for a strike by using models to measure the
probability that the strike will be maintained an extra day.
Accordingly, we use the model where once a trial begins, there is a
probability that it will be terminated the next day or else it will
continue to be analyzed by the respective provider.
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DATA
We use two different databases for the four providers, WIPO,
NAF, eRes, and CPR, for the period from January 2000 to November
2002. The first database utilized in this section was obtained from
the UDRP web site and contains 7148 cases from January 2000 to
November 2002. The cases are separated by provider and by the
duration, in days, of each case. The second database was obtained
from the work of the Convergence Center.179 This database contains
a series of variables for the first 3850 cases from December 1999 to
July 2001.180 From this database we have been able to compile a
series of different variables as described in Appendix B.
C. RESULTS
The UDRP was created in 1999 and immediately attracted the
attention of Internet users, especially businesses. This was the first
attempt by a dispute system with global reach to encompass most of
the Internet. As a consequence, providers have been busy evaluating
the most diverse complaints.
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the total number of cases
presented in each month. There was a sharp increase in the number
of complaints presented during the initial months of 2000, possibly a
consequence of the implementation of the UDRP regime.181 Starting
in August 2000 and throughout 2001, the number of cases steadily
decreased. In 2002, there was a small increase in the number of
cases from March to June, but afterwards the number of cases
continued to decline.
The declining number of cases is the consequence of two
main factors. First, because most of the disputes associated with
earlier domain names were already settled during 2000 and 2001, the
incoming number of new disputes was much lower. Furthermore,
the existence of the UDRP system may act as a deterrent for users
engaged in mass registration of names or for those looking to make
quick profits by registering proprietary names and brands of others.
Second, the economic downturn of technology-related economic

179. See http://dcc.syr.edu/projectlist.htm
180. See http://dcc.syr.edu/marklepage.htm
181. “If we examine when the names challenged under the UDRP were registered, we find a significant
concentration of challenged names in the first quarter of 2000. .. The first quarter of 2000 stands out as a huge
peak. The period was too early for the UDRP to have a significant deterrent effect on cybersquatters, yet
immediately followed ICANN’s introduction of registrar competition which stimulated the marketing and
consumption of gTLD domains. The number of disputed names drops off precipitously in the second and third
quarters of 2000.” Mueller, supra note 35, at 5.
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activities, especially in respect to e-commerce, could have impacted
the number of complaints and disputes for domain names.
The number of disputes will likely increase in the future, as
the Internet increasingly expands into a more international
environment and becomes more popular in other countries outside of
the United States and the European Union. Between January 2000
and June 2003, the UDRP has evaluated 8,549 cases, and most of
them have been divided among two main providers, NAF and WIPO
(Figure 3). As Figure 3 illustrates, WIPO and NAF have decided
95.5% of the cases. The closest competitor, with just 3.3%, eRes, is
no longer a provider for the UDRP regime.
Examining the evolution of the number of cases received by
each provider over time shows how the system has evolved around
two main providers (Figure 4). During the first year, the dominance
of WIPO, an active participant in the process of delineating the
UDRP, is apparent. Accordingly, the number of cases received by
WIPO (60% of the total) strongly surpassed those of NAF (32%),
eRes (7.6%) and CPR (0.7%).
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FIGURE 3

Total Number of Cases by Provider
(January 2000 to June 2003)
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FIGURE 4
UDRP Number of Cases by Provider
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FIGURE 5
Duration Cases by Month of Beginning of Procedure
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In the second year, there was still a tendency for WIPO to
receive more cases that NAF. Although WIPO received 60% of the
cases, NAF increased its participation to 37%. NAF’s increased
participation was due to a reduction in the number of cases handled
by eRes to 3.4%. Meanwhile, CPR remained at 0.6%. In 2002, the
tendency changed as a result of a convergence in the number of cases
between NAF and WIPO. NAF increased its participation to 46%
and WIPO decreased its participation to 52%. At the same time,
eRes went out of business in the end of 2001, and CPR continued to
have an insignificant share. In 2002, ADNDRC was created, but it
managed just 0.8% of the total number of cases. In 2003, the
tendency continued with the two main providers polarizing the cases.
WIPO received 50% of the cases, NAF 46%, CPR 1.6% and
ADNDRC 2%. At this time, the system seems to have reached
equilibrium with two main providers receiving an almost similar
quantity of cases.
In the future, ADNDRC will increase its number of cases to
reflect its exclusive geographic region of operations. The actual
duration of cases from month to month suggests that there were
almost no differences in the duration of the cases over time (Figure
5). There were, however, some outliers at the initial stages of the
system. But, most of the months show average similar values for the
duration. In the next section we present the econometric results on
the performance of the UDRP system.
The predominance of the United States and Europe is present
in the geographic distribution of cases (Table 7). Moreover, we
considered both the origin of complainants and respondents in each
case in our database from December 1999 to July 2001. A higher
proportion of complainants come from developed countries in
Europe, the United States, Canada and Japan, which represent 80%
of all the complaints. On the other hand, these same countries
represent 73% of all the respondents. In summary, this increase in
the number of respondents in developing countries could be
consistent with the lack of both secure trademark protection and
cyber squatting enforcement (Table 7).
Interestingly, in classifying the cases of each provider with
respect to the geographic origin of the complainants, the complaints
of the NAF (83%) and CPR (76%) came mainly from their host
country, the United States (Figure 6).
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TABLE 7: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF COMPLAINANTS AND RESPONDENTS
RESPONDENTS

NUMBER PERCENTAG

COMPLAINANTS

NUMBER PERCENTAGE

E

United States
Great Britain
Canada
Spain
Republic of Korea
Australia
Italy
France
India
Sweden
China
Russia
Switzerland
Germany
Ireland
Brazil
Hong Kong
Netherlands
Japan
Africa
Rest of Latin America
Rest of Europe
Rest Asia
Middle East
Unknown
TOTAL
United States
Europe
Latin America and
North America
Asia
Middle East
Africa
Unknown
TOTAL

1,983
201
153
134
107
67
50
41
35
34
34
30
29
27
24
23
22
21
16
7
101
74
69
61
510
3,853
1,983
665
277

51.5
5.2
4.0
3.5
2.8
1.7
1.3
1.1
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.2
2.6
1.9
1.8
1.6
13.2
100.0
51.5
17.3
7.2

350
61
7
510
3,853

9.1
1.6
0.2
13.2
100.0

United States
Great Britain
France
Spain
Canada
Germany
Italy
Australia
India
Japan
Netherlands
Switzerland
Sweden
Brazil
Other European
Asia
Rest of Latin America
Africa
Middle East
Unknown

United States
Europe
Latin America and
North America
Asia
Middle East
Africa
Unknown

Source: Own elaboration based on Convergence Center database
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2,124
206
121
113
104
89
64
49
48
46
44
42
40
34
104
60
58
17
10
480

55.1
5.3
3.1
2.9
2.7
2.3
1.7
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.0
0.9
2.7
1.6
1.5
0.4
0.3
12.5

3,853
2,124
823
196

100.0
55.1
21.4
5.1

203
10
17
480
3,853

5.3
0.3
0.4
12.5
100.0

Although, the dominant country of origin for WIPO is
also the United States with 41%, Europe accounts for 32% of
WIPO’s cases. Additionally, eRes received 44 % of its cases
from the United States, 26% from Canada, and 10% from
Europe. The rest of the regions of the world participate
marginally in each of these providers, even though WIPO is
the recipient of the majority of these claims. Furthermore,
duration also varies across providers and regions, and NAF is
much faster than WIPO in all the different regions (Figure 6).
Some of the cases decided by the UDRP providers
have been challenged in the United States courts. We
identified a total of fifteen such cases since the inception of
the UDRP regime. Of these cases, nine were handled by
WIPO, five by NAF, and one by eRes. In three of these
cases, the federal court reversed in total the UDRP providers’
decision. In four cases, it reversed the decision in part. In
eight cases, it affirmed the providers’ decisions. In one case,
the court declared that it did not have jurisdiction because the
case involved a government from another country.

53

FIGURE 6
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FIGURE 6 (CONTINUATION)
Distribution of Cases and Duration: WIPO

53.7

Europe
Latin America and
Canada
Asia and Middle East
Africa

53.1
59.7

50.4

United States

58.3

Unknown

Distribution of Cases and Duration: NAF
43.7

38.3

35
44
Europe
Latin America and
Canada
Asia and Middle East
Africa
United States
Unknown

55

D. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
In this section, we present the factors that determine the
expected number of days that a case is under review. The duration
variable is extremely important because it is one of the main
variables providers can manage achieve their goal of having
complainants select them. With the results obtained based on the
database covering the months from January 2000 to November 2002
we would like to answer two main questions. First, what are the
general duration characteristics of the system as a whole? Second,
are there differences in duration among providers? The first question
will help to describe the procedure and determine the expected
duration of the system as a whole. Forum shopping is the goal of the
second question.
One of the main objectives of ICANN is to establish a system
with many private providers and a common set of rules and
regulations. However, because the complainant picks the provider,
differences among them may include a bias that could be exploited
by the complainants. Consequently, the duration depends on many
factors and characteristics of each provider and is also different for
each provider.
Although the structural differences among providers results
in forum shopping opportunities, if the duration functions are
statistically the same among providers, the ICANN system would
have be successful in providing a homogeneous system for dispute
resolution on the Internet. Figure 7 illustrates the Kaplan-Meyer
survival function.
This function allows us to analyze the
performance of the entire system. The horizontal axis measures the
duration of the cases in days, and the vertical axis shows the
probability of surviving one extra day. Accordingly, the expected
mean duration for the whole system is 54 days (Table 8).
Furthermore, the results of the different probabilities of survival are:
up to 31 days the probability of survival is higher than 90%; up to 40
days it is higher than 70%; for a duration of 47 days the probability is
higher than 50%; the probability of survival is higher than 30% for
duration above 56 days; and finally, for duration of up to 83 days, the
probability of survival is at least 10%. These results suggest that the
system is providing a relatively fast procedure for evaluating
complaints, because the median duration is just 47 days for the
system as a whole.
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The second question considers the importance of the
differences in duration among providers. Figure 8 shows the results
obtained by drawing a different survival function for each provider.
A simple inspection of Figure 8 suggests that there are two extreme
providers, NAF with the lowest duration function and WIPO with
the highest duration function. The other providers are located
somewhere in between these two extremes and are the ones that
polarize the number of complaints of the whole system.
In order to determine the statistical differences among
duration curves, we use a set of tests designed to compare survival
functions. The tests are the log-rank test, the Wilcoxon test, and the
Cox test. Table 9 shows the values for these tests, which support
the contention that the duration functions between providers are
statistically different. This result is very important because there
are differences in the structure and procedure of each of the
providers that provide the possibility of forum shopping under the
UDRP system.
Furthermore, the duration function, and
consequently the technology function, is different for each court. In
the next section, we will analyze the factors that determine this
difference in duration among providers.
E. DURATION ANALYSIS BY PROVIDER
In the previous section, we showed that the duration functions
for each provider are different and, therefore, should be evaluated
separately. In this section, we will analyze the different factors
behind the specific structure of each provider and how these factors
produce a different duration function. Accordingly, we use a Cox
semi-parametric duration model for the analysis of the cases in each
court. This model will allow us to introduce independent variables to
explain the differences in behavior in each provider, without
imposing any specific structure on the hazard function.
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FIGURE 7

Kaplan-Meyer Survival Estimate
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TABLE 8: DURATION CHARACTERISTICS
Category
no. of subjects
no. of records
(first) entry time
(final) exit time
subjects with gap
time on gap if gap
time at risk
Failures

Total

Mean

7,330
7,330

Min

Median

Max

1
0
54.368

1
0
1

1
0
47

1
0
856

0
0
398,521

54.368

1

47

856

7,148

0.975

0

1

1

58

140

FIGURE 8

Kaplan-Meyer Survival Estimate by Provider
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TABLE 9: TESTS OF EQUALITY OF SURVIVAL CURVES
Cox regression-based test
Provider
Observed
Expected
Hazard
NAF
2731
1740.85
1.674
WIPO
4079
5110.42
0.830
eRes
286
246.24
1.223
CPR
52
50.48
1.081
Total
7148
7148
1.000
2
2
LR Chi (4)=734.45 Prob. Chi =0.000
Log-rank test
Provider
Observed
Expected
NAF
2731
1740.85
WIPO
4079
5110.43
Eres
286
246.24
CPR
52
50.48
Total
7148
7148
Chi2(3)=834.61Prob. Chi2=0.0000
Wilcoxon Test
Provider
Observed
Expected
Sum of Ranks
NAF
2731
1740.85
5440025
WIPO
4079
5110.43
-5562113
Eres
286
246.24
126492
CPR
52
50.48
-4404
Total
7148
7148
0
Chi2(3)=1131.40 Prob. Chi2=0.0000
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In order to analyze the structure of each provider, we utilize
the database constructed by Mueller that contains more than 3000
cases compiled during 2000-2001.182 Table 10 shows the differences
between each provider in terms of duration based on the KaplanMeier estimator.183 WIPO is the provider with the greatest expected
duration, a mean duration of 57 days and a median duration of 51
days. The fastest provider is NAF, with a mean duration of 38 days
and a median of 35. This difference between the providers located at
the extremes is very important. WIPO takes 48% more than the
average time expected under NAF. In fact, even when NAF
concentrates most of its efforts on cases in the United States, NAF
has a consistently shorter duration than WIPO (Figure 8). The same
behavior is observed with respect to eRes and CPR, which, in
general, are faster than WIPO, but slower than NAF.
Table 10 presents the variables that best explain the behavior
of each of the providers based on the Cox model. After running a
general model for each provider we tested for the fulfillment of the
main assumption of the Cox model, the proportional hazard
assumption.184 The test results suggested that the variables for some
of the panelists included in our models did not pass the proportional
hazard tests. For these judges, the structure of the duration function
is different than for the rest of the provider’s cases.

182.

183

See Appendix C for a complete list of the variables used in this analysis.
These results are based on the different duration functions calculated in the previous section for each

provider.
184. See Appendix D for the complete presentation of the results.
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FIGURE 8
70.0

Average Duration by Provider and Region

60.0

Days

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

-

Europe

Latin America and
Canada

Asia and Middle
East
Region

Africa

NAF

United States

WIPO

eRes

CPR

TABLE 10: CHARACTERISTICS OF DURATION FUNCTIONS FOR EACH PROVIDER
WIPO
Category

Total

no. of subjects

1,999

no. of records

1,999

(final) exit time

Failures

Median

Max

Category

25
25

1

1

1

no. of records

0

0

0

(first) entry time

57.39

6

51

420

0

time on gap if gap
57.39

6

51

420

1,999

1

1

1

1

time at risk
Failures

Total
1,123

no. of records

1,123

(first) entry time
(final) exit time

1

1

0

0

0

46.32

20

43

72

1158

46.32

20

43

72

25

1

1

1

1

0
0

1

Min

1

Median

1

Max

1

0

1

1

1

38.73

4

35

407

Category

Total

no. of subjects

209

no. of records

209

(first) entry time

0

0
130

9999

47.84

20

44

130

209

1

1

1

1

0
0

407

1,123

1

1

1

1
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time at risk
Failures

1

44

time on gap if gap
35

1

Max

0

subjects with gap

4

1

Median

20

0
38.73

1

Min

0

0

43,489

Mean

47.84

(final) exit time

time on gap if gap

Failures

Max

1

subjects with gap

time at risk

Median

E-RES

Mean

no. of subjects

Min

0

NAF
Category

Mean

1

(final) exit time
subjects with gap

114,719

Total

no. of subjects

0

0

time on gap if gap
time at risk

Min

1

(first) entry time

Subjects with gap

CPR

Mean

The results of Table 11 indicate some curious results. For
WIPO, the following variables have a positive impact on the duration
function, implying a faster resolution of the cases and a lower
probability of survival: Default, Respse, Compse, Compca,
Complaw, Dorf, P., and Limbury, A.
The variables that have a negative impact, implying a longer
resolution time, are: Split, Respus, Compus, Compin, and Bernstein.
Default represents those complaints where the respondent does not
reply to the charges of the complainant. Split represents those cases
where the panel has a split decision. The positive sign implies that
the panelists have less trouble in quickly deciding these types of
cases; the cases are generally decided in favor of the complainant.
The negative impact on the duration is because of the time needed by
the panel to decide the case.185
Judicial represents those cases in which the panelists revised
previous cases in order to reach a decision. The positive sign for this
variable indicates that as the panelist, or panelists, find cases similar
to the one they were considering, the panel will need less time to
decide the case.
The variables Respus and Compus represent cases in which
both the respondent and the complainant are from the United States.
Because the effect of both variables is negative, we can conclude that
a negative bias exists with respect to claims or responses coming
from the United States.186 The same effect is present for Compin,
which represents complainants coming from India. Alternately, the
variables Respse and Compse represent cases where the respondent,
the claimant, or both, are from Switzerland. For these variables, the
coefficient is positive. A positive coefficient indicates that, on
average, the WIPO panels take less time to resolve disputes having a
positive bias toward Switzerland.
Because the geographical
headquarters of WIPO is in Geneva, Switzerland, this effect could be
due to a more comprehensive knowledge of laws and institutions of
the country. We observe the same effect for the variable, Compca,
which represents claims where the complainant is from Canada.

185

186.

Usually, split cases are more difficult to resolve, causing the panel to spend more time on them.
A negative bias exists in the sense that the panel is taking more time to decide the cases.
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WIPO
Variables
Coefficient
Default
1.238

TABLE 11: COX SEMI-PARAMETRIC DURATION MODEL
NAF
CPR
Variables
Coefficient
Variables
Coefficient
Default
1.411

(0.05767)

Split

0.530
0.907

2.400

1.650

Compde

2.069

0.882

Compnac

3.908

Complaw

Employee

2.608

(53.71631)

Ascomp

18.704

(0.68328)

Namecan

5.748

(30.42342)

Asresp

4.418

(1.76611)

(3.66312)

Respciii

3.408

(2.229)

1.106

(0.04643)

Compse

41.193

(1.0989)

(0.34673)

Compus

(0.29431)

Split

(0.43334)

(0.04657)

Respse

Coefficient
1.914

(0.09149)

Respru

(0.08911)

Respus

ERES

Variables
Default

(1.81084)

Compca

0.739

(0.04206)

(0.10688)

1.468
(0.32872)

Compin

0.679
(0.10055)

Compca

1.518
(0.24300)

Judicial

1.085
(0.03865)

Buchele, J.

1

Buchele, J.

2.640
(0.40042)

Carmody, J.

1

Carmody, J.

Buchele, J.

8.763

Buchele, J.

9.317

(6.425)

1

(3.21267)

Carmody, J.

14.829
(4.83855)

Dorf, P.

2.672
(0.70459)

Johnson, C.
Kalina, H.

1
1

Kalina, H.

Yachnin, R.

1

Yachnin, R.

2.322
(0.30927)

1

Yachnin, R.

22.241
(6.26071)

Limbury, A.

1.779
(0.38403)

Bernstein

0.684
(0.08541)

Nr
Observations
Nr Failures
Time at risk
Wald
Chi2(df)
Probability
Chi2
Log
Likelihood

1996

1119

25

209

1996
114471
135.8
(df=12)
0.000

1119
43313
156.61
(df=7)
0.000

25
1158
11.46
(df=4)
0.0219

209
9999
154.87
(df=8)
0.000

-12292.70

-6141.25

-53.40

-884.87
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The presence of either positive or negative bias acts as a
general negative indicator of the performance of the provider. Bias
implies that the provider is not up to the task of generating an
universal and objective dispute resolution system for the Internet.
All of the panelists except one have a positive impact on the
duration function.187 This implies that the panelists, having received
the highest number of cases, proceed with the cases with certain
independence. Furthermore, for WIPO, panelists Buchele, Carmody,
Johnson, Kalina, and Yachnin not only have a positive impact on the
duration function, but also lack the same assumed proportional
hazard for all the cases. This implies that these panelists do not
follow the same general procedures as other WIPO panelists. Figure
9 shows the differences in the duration function between these
panelists and the rest of the cases. Figure 10 also shows the
differences in hazard functions. Although in all cases the hazard
function appears to be exponential, indicating that the cases face an
increasing probability of being solved, this hazard is still higher for
the panelists under analysis.
Table 12 shows the different duration for each panelist under
different probabilities of survival. The different results indicate the
importance of the effect specific panelists can have on the system.
Accordingly, the selection procedure for the panelists is not
innocuous. Because the provider selects the president of the panel,
or in the case of sole panels, selects the arbitrator in charge, the
differences between the panelists can have important implications for
the results of the cases.
Table 13 illustrates how the types of cases received by the
judges along with the verdict they render are significantly different
from the rest of the panelists and the provider system as a whole.
The t-statistics suggest that there is no difference in the results
between these panelists and the rest of the cases. Therefore, WIPO’s
optimal behavior is to rely on these panelists, who are fastest, in
order to improve the performance of the provider and attract more
complainants. In the next section, we will explore the performance
of judges across providers.

187. In our initial model we considered all panelists for the four providers that participated in at least
twenty cases. However, the ones showed in the econometric results are those that have a statistically
significant impact on the duration function.
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FIGURE 9
WIPO: Survival Functions by Judge
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FIGURE 10
WIPO: Hazard Functions by Judge
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TABLE 12: WIPO, DURATION FOR EACH PANELIST
Probability of
Survival
0.9
0.7
0.5
0.3
0.1

All
Cases
38
45
53
64
87

Buchele, J.
28
32
38
43
60

Carmody, J.
29
32
37
42
55

Johnson, C.
34
36
40
42
54

Kalina, H.
30
33
35
41
48

Yachnin, R.
24
31
34
37
43

TABLE 13: WIPO RESULTS OF CASES BY TYPE OF JUDGES
TYPE OF RESPONDENT
Unaffili

Licensee

Competit

Employee

Criticor
0.08

Unknown

Bernstein

0.72

0.05

0.05

0.05

Limbury, A.

0.76

0.03

0.17

0.03

0.05

Yachnin, R.

0.75

0.10

0.05

0.05

Kalina, H.

0.92

Johnson, C.

0.70

Dorf, P.

0.88

Carmody, J.

0.86

Buchele, J.

0.75

0.04

0.13

TOTA PANELISTS 1

0.78

0.03

0.06

0.04

0.03

0.05

Abbot, F.

0.70

0.04

0.07

0.04

0.04

0.09

Barker, L.

0.82

0.07

0.02

0.04

0.02

0.02

Donahey, M.

0.78

0.02

0.12

0.08

Samuels, J.

0.89

0.05

0.05

Page, R.

0.72

0.15

Foster, D.

0.78

Bianchi, R.

0.69

TOTAL PANELISTS 2

0.77

0.03

0.09

0.02

0.02

0.07

REST OF CASES
T-TEST PANELISTS1 VS
PANELISTS2

0.66

0.02

0.07

0.02

0.02

0.20

0.9870

0.4790

-0.4510

0.9180

-1.8000

Probability

0.3617

0.6792

0.6756

0.4557

0.2136

0.05

0.08
0.03

0.09

0.06

0.04

0.04

0.08

0.03

0.04

0.07

0.04

0.08
0.06

0.05

0.09

0.06

0.03

0.14
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0.08

0.17

-

TABLE 13 (CONTINUATION)
TYPE OF RESPONSE
Default

Lateresp

PANEL DECISION
Transfer

Dismiss

Bernstein

0.38

0.69

0.26

Limbury, A.

0.41

0.69

0.28

Yachnin, R.

0.50

0.80

0.20

Kalina, H.

0.58

0.83

0.13

Johnson, C.

0.40

0.69

0.28

Dorf, P.

0.69

0.92

0.04

Carmody, J.

0.57

Buchele, J.

0.50

TOTAL PANELISTS 1

0.49

Abbot, F.

0.40

Barker, L.

0.40

0.71

0.24

Donahey, M.

0.55

0.82

0.10

Samuels, J.

0.47

0.84

0.16

Page, R.

0.36

0.03

0.69

0.28

Foster, D.

0.34

0.03

0.66

0.31

0.02

0.00

0.02

Termin

Namecan

0.03

Split
0.03

0.03

0.04
0.01

0.01
0.04

0.90

0.10

0.83

0.08

0.08

0.78

0.19

0.01

0.01

0.70

0.30

0.04

0.02

0.01

0.04
0.02

0.03
0.03

Bianchi, R.

0.59

0.76

0.07

0.17

TOTAL PANELISTS 2

0.44

0.01

0.74

0.22

0.03

0.00

0.01

REST OF CASES
T-TEST PANELISTS1 VS
PANELISTS2

0.43

0.01

0.67

0.15

0.17

0.00

0.01

1.1500

1.1760

-0.5440

Probability

0.2940

0.2843

0.6062

-
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Each of NAF’s variables has a positive impact on the
Survival function, i.e., these variables decrease the expected duration
of the cases. Default and Complaw have a positive effect, thereby
decreasing the duration of the review process. Respru, Compde, and
Compnac correspond to the bias for certain complainants or
responses coming from specific countries. Respru, representing
those respondents coming from Russia, has a lower resolution time.
Compde and Compnac are the variables for the complainants from
Germany and North America. Complainants from Germany and
North America receive a faster resolution of their cases as compared
with other complainants. For North American complainants, the bias
could be the consequence of the geographical location of NAF in the
United States and the high proportion of panelists also from the
United States. This type of bias could present a problem for reaching
a homogeneous system of dispute resolution in the Internet. In
summary, fewer of these panelists have specific duration functions
when compared with WIPO.
Only two panelists, Carmody, J. and Yachnin, R. do not fit in
the proportional hazard assumption of the general model. The
survival and hazard functions for these two panelists are shown in
Figures 11 and 12. Similar to the previous results, these panelists are
much faster in resolving cases than the rest of the judges for NAF.
Moreover, although the hazard functions are much steeper for both
panelists, the hazard functions are exponential. Table 14 shows the
difference in duration for specific probabilities of failure.
Table 15 illustrates the data and t-statistics that help to
determine if the resulting verdicts of the panelists are significantly
different from other panelists.
Clearly, there are no major
differences among panelists, with the exception that the panelists
with a different hazard received a higher number of cases where the
respondent was in default. Of interest is that the all the judges that
managed an important number of cases have produced a higher
proportion of verdicts favoring the complainant.188

188.

The variable Transfer is much higher for the panelist selected than for the rest of the cases.
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FIGURE 11
NAF: Survival Functions by Judges

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
Probability

0.6
0.5

All Cases
Carmody, J.
Yachnin, R.

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0

20

40

60

80
Days

100

120

140

FIGURE 12
NAF: Hazard Functions by Judges
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TABLE 14: NAF, DURATION FOR EACH PANELIST
PROBABILITY
0.9
0.7
0.5
0.3
0.1

ALL
CASES
30
35
39
43
59

CARMODY, J.
25
28
31
33
40

YACHNIN, R.
23
27
30
32
35

TABLE 15: NAF RESULTS PER PANELISTS
Type of Respondent
Unaffili

Licensee

Competit

Employee

Criticor
0.02

Unknown

Buchele, J.

0.74

0.05

0.16

0.02

Carmody, J.

0.81

0.04

0.09

0.04

0.02

Kalina, H.

0.73

0.03

0.18

0.03

Yachnin, R.

0.86

0.03

0.06

0.01

0.01

0.03

TOTAL PANELISTS 1

0.80

0.04

0.11

0.03

0.01

0.03

Bernstein

0.89

Bianchi, R.

0.84

Foster, D.

0.65

Limbury, A.

0.61

Page, R.

0.90

Samuels, J.

0.86

0.07

0.00

Johnson, C.

0.63

0.08

0.13

0.10

Dorf, P.

0.65

0.10

0.13

0.13

Donahey, M.

0.60

0.10

0.10

0.10

Barker, L.

0.65

0.04

0.22

0.09

Abbot, F.

0.64

0.07

0.14

0.14

TOTAL PANELISTS 2

0.69

0.06

0.13

0.08

0.01

0.01

REST OF CASES
T TEST PANELISTS 1 AND
2

0.58

0.05

0.13

0.04

0.02

0.18

0.9794

-0.9324

-0.1253

-1.4330

-0.1676

0.6169

Probability

0.3453

0.3681

0.9022

0.1755

0.8695

0.5480

0.03
0.03

0.11
0.05

0.05

0.11

0.05

0.29

0.06

0.11

0.17

0.10
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0.07
0.04

0.02

0.10

TABLE 15 (CONTINUATION)
Type of Response
Default

Lateresp

Type of Decision
Transfer

Dismiss

Termin

Namecan

Split

Juez 36

0.60

0.00

0.86

0.14

0.00

0.00

0.00

Carmody, J.

0.73

0.00

0.93

0.06

0.01

0.00

0.00

Kalina, H.

0.52

0.03

0.76

0.24

0.00

0.00

0.00

Yachnin, R.

0.71

0.01

0.90

0.07

0.03

0.00

0.00

TOTAL PANELISTS1

0.67

0.01

0.89

0.10

0.01

0.00

0.00

Bernstein

0.44

0.00

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Bianchi, R.

0.58

0.00

0.89

0.05

0.05

0.00

0.00

Foster, D.

0.47

0.00

0.82

0.18

0.00

0.00

0.00

Limbury, A.

0.50

0.00

0.83

0.17

0.00

0.00

0.00

Page, R.

0.60

0.00

0.90

0.10

0.00

0.00

0.00

Samuels, J.

0.57

0.00

0.79

0.14

0.00

0.07

0.00

Johnson, C.

0.40

0.00

0.71

0.27

0.00

0.02

0.00

Dorf, P.

0.52

0.00

0.77

0.19

0.00

0.03

0.00

Donahey, M.

0.30

0.00

0.80

0.10

0.10

0.00

0.00

Barker, L.

0.57

0.00

0.87

0.13

0.00

0.00

0.00

Abbot, F.

0.64

0.00

0.64

0.21

0.00

0.14

0.00

TOTAL PANELISTS 2

0.50

0.00

0.80

0.17

0.01

0.02

0.00

REST OF CASES
T TEST PANELISTS 1 AND
2

0.38

0.00

0.64

0.17

0.17

0.01

0.01

2.2583

0.7457

-2559.0000

-0.2553

Probability

0.0418

0.4691

0.8020

0.8025
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All the variables of the CPR have a positive impact on the
duration function; the variables reduce the expected evaluation time
for the cases. Strangely, the cases where the panel had a divided
opinion, Split, had a positive coefficient. We should ordinarily
expect that the cases having a split decision should be more difficult.
This is the only factor, among the different characteristics of the
cases and the proofs presented, that has an impact on the duration of
the cases. Ascomp and Asresp both have positive signs, implying a
faster resolution for cases in which the respondent and/or the
complainant come from Asia. This represents a geographical bias
for this provider.
Although Buchele, J. is the only panelist that has a positive
impact on the duration function, Buchele, J. stays within the same
proportional hazard function as the rest of the cases for the provider.
Figures 13 and 14 illustrate the survival and hazard functions for
CPR.189
For eRes, all of the variables have a positive sign except for
Compcan. As expected, Default has a positive effect on reducing
case duration. Employee, which represents those cases where the
respondent is an employee of the complainant, has a positive sign.
This implies a faster resolution rate for those cases. In reality, it is
easier to solve for variables representing the final decision of the
panel.190
The provider resolved cases especially fast when the
respondent presented proof of its rights over the domain name
according to the rule 4.c.iii of the UDRP (variable Respciii in the
model).191 This could be proof of a general bias within eRes in favor
of respondents, in contrast with WIPO and NAF, whose systems
were more receptive to the presentation of proof by complainants.

189.
190.
rapidly.

The hazard function is exponential, meaning that cases have an increasing rate of being solved.
Those cases in which the panel decided that the name should be changed have been solved more
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FIGURE 13
CPR Survival Function
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FIGURE 14
CPR Hazard Function
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FIGURE 15
eRes: Survival Function
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FIGURE 16

eRes: Hazard Function
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The variable Compca represents those claims where the
complainant is from Canada and has a negative sign, implying a
longer duration. This bias suggests that the panel of eRes devoted
more time to analyzing complaints coming from Canada. Not
surprisingly, eRes’ headquarters is in Quebec, Canada.
Three of the panelists had a positive sign. This decreased the
expected duration. None of these variables violate the assumption of
a proportional hazard function. Figures 15 and 16 illustrate the
survival and hazard functions for eRes.
Finally, those variables that are not included in the results
because they are not statistically significant are nonetheless
important. We found that it does not matter which type of
respondent we have in each case, for only employees for the case of
NAF have an impact on the results. This is an important attribute of
the UDRP system because the relationship of the parties in a case
should have no bearing on the eventual decision. Additionally, we
observed several key features of the UDRP system: (1) the
respondent delivering its response late does not effect the duration
model; (2) the number of late response cases is low, only 48; (3) it is
not significant that the complainant and respondent are from
different countries; (4) with the exception of eRes, the presentation
of proof supporting the complainant or the respondent does not speed
up the case;192 and (5) all the countries and panelists that are not
included in the econometric model were eliminated because of their
lack of statistically significant results.
1. Panelists across Providers

Although some panelists are influenced by providers, other
panelists are completely independent of providers’ influence.193 To
see if these panelists behave in a similar fashion regardless of the
provider they are working for, in this section we evaluate the
performance of the panelists across providers. If panelists have a
similar duration function regardless of the provider they work for,
then the panelists are totally independent.194 On the other hand, if
panelists act differently for different providers, then the institutional
arrangement of the different providers becomes very important in
192. See Appendix A (describing the UDRP rules for providing evidence for complainants and
respondents).
193. “In some UDRP cases, arbitration panelists may ignore critical aspects of the policy, define the
criteria in the UDRP so broadly that they become meaningless. Some level variation among individual
arbitrators based on their experience, their views of trademark laws and varying interpretations of the facts
should be expected.” Brooks, supra note 20, at 323.
194. This would mean that the institutional structure of the provider did not influence their activities.
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determining the procedure and, ultimately, the efficiency and speed
of the entire system.
In this analysis, we determined that the differences among
providers affect the performance of the system. In our analysis, we
used four panelists that received cases from two providers: Buchele,
J., Kalina, H., Carmody, J. and Yachnin, R. Figure 17 compares the
Survival function for each of these panelists using the different
providers. In most of the cases there are notable differences in the
survival functions. These differences are more easily seen in Table
16, which shows the duration for different probabilities of survival.
Table 16 suggests that NAF has a more efficient mechanism to
handle claims. Accordingly, the same panelists are faster in NAF
than they are in WIPO.195

195. If we take each panelist and run a Cox proportional model, we find that one of the most important
variables that explain the duration is the provider under which the panelist is analyzing the claim.
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FIGURE 17
Survival Function Panelist Buchele
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TABLE 16: COMPARISON OF PANELISTS ACROSS PROVIDERS
Buchele, J.
Carmody, J.
Kalina, H.
WIPO NAF Diff.
WIPO NAF Diff.
WIPO NAF Diff.
28
27
1
29
25
4
30
27
3
32
29
3
32
28
4
33
30
3
38
31
7
38
31
7
35
33
2
43
33
10
42
33
9
41
35
6
50
38
12
55
40
15
48
39
9
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100

Yachnin, R.
WIPO NAF Diff.
24
23
1
31
28
3
34
30
4
37
32
5
43
35
8

2. Default

Many respondents fail to respond to the providers and also
fail to defend themselves from complainants’ claims, thus making it
easier for the panel to give a verdict favoring the complainant. The
absence of documentation from the respondent challenging the
complainant’s allegations makes it easier for the panelists to evaluate
such cases. Consequently, we found that the duration in these cases
is much lower than for other cases. In each regression, except for
CPR, the cases in default were important to the explanation for the
duration function of the respective provider. In this section, we
analyze whether a given case that is in default yields a different
duration depending on the provider. This analysis should produce
further evidence of fundamental structural differences among
providers.
Table 17 illustrates the expected duration of cases where the
respondent is in default and also shows the different survival
probabilities. NAF is still faster than WIPO and eRes, and eRes is
faster than WIPO. Additionally, as the probability of survival
decreases, the difference in expected duration increases between
NAF and WIPO, NAF and eRes, and eRes and WIPO. Accordingly,
this result reinforces our previous analysis and conclusions that the
providers have structural differences among them.
3. Type of Panels

Another main issue surrounding the UDRP debate is the type
of panels that should be put in place. Currently there are two types of
panels, single member panels and three member panels. According
to Geist, the bias of the UDRP that favors complainants could be
solved by simply changing to a general three member panel system
and abandoning the one member panel. In this section we evaluate
the efficiency implications of such a change, i.e., the impact of
having three member panels in the UDRP system on the duration of
the process. Accordingly, we test the duration function, using a
Kaplan-Meyer estimator for those cases with three member panels as
compared with those with one member panels. Figure 18 shows both
duration functions.
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TABLE 17: CASES IN DEFAULT ACROSS PROVIDERS
Probability
0.9
0.7
0.5
0.3
0.1

WIPO
(1)
36
42
48
57
76

NAF
(2)
26
30
33
37
42

eRes
(3)
30
37
40
46
56

Probability
0.9
0.7
0.5
0.3
0.1

WIPO
36
44
53
64
92

NAF
27
34
37
42
55

eRes
34
41
45
55
71

Dif WIPODif WIPO-eRes
Dif eRes-NAF
NAF
(4)=(1)-(2)
(5=(1)-(3)
(6)=(3)-(2)
10
6
4
12
5
7
15
8
7
20
11
9
34
20
14
CASES THAT ARE NOT IN DEFAULT
Dif WIPO-NAF Dif WIPO-eRes
Dif eRes-NAF
9
2
7
10
3
7
16
8
8
22
9
13
37
21
16
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Percentage Difference
(4)/(1) (5)/(1) (6)/(3)
27.8
16.7
13.3
28.6
11.9
18.9
31.3
16.7
17.5
35.1
19.3
19.6
44.7
26.3
25.0
Percentage Difference
25.0
5.6
20.6
22.7
6.8
17.1
30.2
15.1
17.8
34.4
14.1
23.6
40.2
22.8
22.5

FIGURE 18
Survival Function by Type of Panel
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TABLE 18: LOG-RANK TEST FOR EQUALITY OF SURVIVOR
FUNCTIONS

Events
Type p
0
1
Total

Observed
271
2681
2952

Expected
293.68
2658.32
2952

chi2(1) = 2.04
Pr>chi2 = 0.1527
COX REGRESSION-BASED TEST FOR EQUALITY OF SURVIVAL
CURVES

Events
Relative
Type p
Observed
Expected
Hazard
0
29
293.68
0.9228
1
26
2658.32
1.0089
Total
2952?
2952
1
LR chi2(1) = 2.00
Pr>chi2 = 0.1573
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As the results indicate, there is almost no change between the
duration curves. Also, the duration for the three member panels
seems to be slightly above the mean duration for single member
panels.
Table 18 shows the log-normal and Cox tests of survival
functions. These tests suggest that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that both duration functions are the same. As a result,
duration does not decline merely as a result of changing from the
actual system to one in which only three member panels are allowed.
Therefore, changing to three member panels could promote the
system’s fairness without compromising efficiency.

V. Results and Policy Implications For Other
ADR Initiatives
The implementation of the UDRP regime and its wide
application to a multiple number of jurisdictions and countries has
prompted attempts to transplant this regime to other types of
disputes, both within and outside Internet markets. Nonetheless,
there are several problems that should be addressed in order to
ensure that ICANN’s UDRP remains a model dispute resolution
regime for both Internet and other markets.
The regression analysis in the previous sections provides
several insights and general observations about the UDRP system.
First, the system is not as homogeneous as ICANN has consistently
suggested. Even though the providers have the same stringent rules
for every case, our duration model suggests that the providers have
significantly different system and technology functions, causing
differences in performance. Accordingly, these differences give rise
to the possibility of forum shopping by complainants. This
possibility is reinforced by the fact that the two most popular
providers are located at the extremes of technological diversity,
polarizing the supply of dispute resolution services. Other less
significant providers, who adjudicate fewer cases, are located
somewhere in between. The variation in performance is also
reinforced by different factors and variables that determine the
different behaviors between these providers.
As a result,
complainants will choose a provider according to the importance
they attach to the different factors which influence their decision.
Further standardization of the general procedures for
handling and deciding claims can solve the problems caused by
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extreme differences among providers.196 On the other hand, if the
current system remains, the market demand for short duration cases
could drive down the number of cases handled by WIPO. NAF’s
share of cases would subsequently increase, thus causing WIPO to
improve its performance.
Cases in which the respondent is in default have a direct
impact on reducing the general duration of cases.197 The amount and
quality of the evidence presented by the complainants and
respondents have an impact on the performance of the providers.
Interestingly, even though WIPO and NAF have been accused of
favoring complainants, they are the providers that are most affected
by complainants’ evidence. Conversely, eRes, recognized as being
more favorable to respondents, is strongly affected by the evidence
presented by the respondents. The results obtained with respect to
the source of law are important in the sense that the providers are
paying attention to the procedural and substantive compliance by
both complainants and providers with the general rules established
by ICANN. This compliance determines the provider performance.
Cases with split decisions also influence WIPO’s and CPR’s
procedures. Although the results are different for both providers,
CPR’s results are more consistent with the expected results.198 For
eRes, there are other two factors affecting duration. First, cases are
solved faster when the respondent is an employee of the
complainant. Second, in cases when the panel decided to change the
domain name, the duration was also shorter. These two effects are
likely to be the result of characteristics other than incentives.
By designing this system for the Internet, the UDRP’s
creators hoped to avoid geographical biases. Despite this planning,
the UDRP providers are still susceptible to such bias. For WIPO,
there is a bias toward the United States, Canada, India, and
Switzerland. For NAF, the bias is toward Germany, North America
(the U.S. principally), and Russia. CPR has a bias for Asian
complainants and respondents. Finally, eRes has a bias for those
cases where the complainant is from Canada.
Each provider’s bias can be attributable to many different
causes. WIPO’s headquarters is located in Switzerland, a fact that
can explain the bias for parties from this country. NAF is located in
196

For example, the extra fees that NAF charges in order to generate an incentive to promote short
responses and complaints and to reduce the total length of the case could be increased.
197
The duration is not the same for all providers, thus supporting the claim that the providers are
structurally different.
198. The cases in which the panel could not make a definitive decision should be more difficult to solve
and should take longer to solve.
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the United States and it is biased toward North American
complainants. CPR, with headquarters in Asia, naturally has a bias
for Asian complainants and respondents. Finally, eRes’ headquarters
in Quebec, Canada, explains the bias toward Canadian complainants.
Location greatly affects each of the main providers. This
geographical bias suggests that the UDRP could be ill-equipped to
handle cases arising from places where the rules and institutions are
different from the provider’s location. Furthermore, bias could be
prejudicial for complainants or respondents facing a case against a
party coming from one of the countries that is favored by the
provider. The solution to this problem is not easy because the
diversity of the panelists does not necessarily improve the situation.
For example, although WIPO is the provider with the greatest
panelist diversity, WIPO is also the provider biased towards the
highest number of countries. It could be that the introduction of new
regional providers, as in the case of the new Asian provider, is a
solution to this problem. Accordingly, the creation of regional
providers could decrease the bias for some countries and improve the
efficiency of the system. Nonetheless, some rules and procedures
should be provided for cases where the parties are from diverse
regions.
Some panelists depart from the general performance observed
in the rest of the cases under a given provider. This could be a
problem if these panelists had a behavior completely different from
other panelists within a provider who received an important number
of cases. The panelists that have a different behavior in terms of
performance do not have a significant effect on the results of the
system. Accordingly, the providers are improving efficiency by
favoring these panelists by giving them more cases to solve.
However, there are some noteworthy differences, such as bias toward
complainants, among panelists that received a high number of claims
compared to the rest of the panelists.
In conclusion, we show that, even though some panelists
have a different performance than the providers they are working for,
they are affected by the structure of the providers. Moreover,
although three member panels are as efficient as single member
panels, panelists’ behavior differs depending on the provider for
which they work. Therefore, the system’s efficiency could be
improved by identifying the characteristics of these panelists that
make them different and faster than the rest of the system. These
characteristics could be implemented within the rules and procedures
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of the providers, thereby improving the efficiency of the system as a
whole.
The procedural rules should be changed to provide an
equitable procedure for both parties. Because of the well-known
pro-complainant “bias,” the geographic differences and the disparate
behavior of panelists, the selection of providers should be
independent of the decision of each party.
Therefore, ICANN
should introduce a system of assigning claims to different providers
without delegating this task to one of the parties, in this case, the
complainants. This change will not hurt competition based on prices
because there currently is very little competition. In addition, in
competition in a very concentrated market, ICANN does not allow
any private ADR provider to participate. Alternatively, in an
oligopolistic market, competitors tend to collude and to compete on
the quality of the service, which, in this case, is based on speed and
complainant bias, rather than on prices.
Another change that should be introduced to improve the
performance of the UDRP is increasing the availability of appeals.
The parties should be able to appeal the verdict of any of the
providers, thereby providing a chance to review procedures and
outcomes at a lower level. Even though this change could increase
the cost of the service, it is important for this regime to gain the trust
of consumers and the private sector.
Given the problems and challenges facing the UDRP today,
we do not advocate simply copying these procedures for use in
another sector or for another set of disputes or issues, especially for
Issues about fairness,
topics related to Internet markets.199
availability of regional providers, and the incentives that these
private providers face, given the design of the procedural rules, will
tend to undermine people’s trust for Internet markets, instead of
enhancing their willingness to participate. Consequently, in order to
succeed in implementing private ADR regimes, we should provide a
thorough analysis of the different characteristics that permit such a
regime to provide effective dispute resolution services that go
beyond the simple “fast and cheap” service.

199

For example, the implementation of an ADR regime for electronic commerce similar to the UDRP
will produce uneasiness among consumers and businesses engaging in transactions on the Internet.
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VI. Conclusions
Numerous scholars and commentators have analyzed ICANN’s
UDRP regime. Most of these studies have concentrated on the
general empirical results of the system. Using different perspectives,
these studies have generally criticized the UDRP providers for being
biased towards complainants and for leaving the respondents without
a fair defense. In our paper, we showed that the emphasis of the
different empirical studies on this bias problem was also “biased.”
The alleged bias of the providers towards the complainants is
not the main variable complainants are looking at in order to decide
the most suitable provider. Instead, complainants seem to regard
provider performance as the main concern in choosing a provider.
Consequently, future analyses should pay more attention to the
relative performance of the different UDRP providers. Accordingly,
the procedural UDRP rules should be analyzed not just in terms of
bias and fairness, but also in terms of the incentives the rules
generate for the rapid and efficient resolution of claims presented
under the UDRP policy. A better understanding of the UDRP is
attainable by paying more attention to the efficiency and
performance indicators of providers and panelists.
Based on our findings about the importance of the UDRP’s
performance, we analyzed the procedural structure of each provider.
From this analysis, we identified the procedure’s duration as the
main indicator of an efficient system. Accordingly, we used duration
models to identify the different factors that influence provider
performance.
Even though the providers consider important factors such as
the evidence provided by the parties, there are still ways to improve
the global performance of the system. First, the providers have
different systems and technologies for resolving cases, thereby
creating opportunities for forum shopping. Despite ICANN’s
attempts to provide uniform rules and policies, the providers still
have exploitable differences. In general, we found that NAF is the
most efficient provider and WIPO is the least efficient. The other
providers rank somewhere between these two extremes.
Second, panelists are important. Although some panelists have
totally different performance functions than the providers they work
for, the specific rules of each provider affect these differences. The
existence of these different panelists could improve efficiency if they
function more quickly, as is true for WIPO.
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Third, because the UDRP is supposed to avoid geographical
discrimination and bias by using a standard set of rules across the
Internet, we should find no discrimination in favor of a particular
country or region. However, we find that the UDRP providers are
geographically biased. Specifically, they are more efficient at
handling cases from places where their headquarters are located.
This bias could have important implications for handling interjurisdictional cases. As a result, a splitting UDRP services into
regions could be desirable in the event that this bias is not eliminated
in the medium term.
Finally, we have found that the election of either a single
member panel or three member panels has no effect on the
performance of the dispute resolution system. This suggests that a
move to three-member panels could improve fairness without
sacrificing efficiency.
The empirical results presented in this work have significant
implications for the business of designing fair and efficient private
dispute resolution services as a whole. Issues such as the incentives
that the ADR providers face given a specific design for the
procedural rules, the availability of regional dispute resolution
providers, concerns about fairness, and cultivating the trust of
consumers and businesses in order to enhance participation are but a
few of the considerations that deserve careful attention when
designing effective private dispute resolution systems.
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I. APPENDIX A
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy200
A. APPLICABLE DISPUTES. You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative
proceeding in the event that a third party (a “complainant”) asserts to the applicable
Provider, in compliance with the Rules of Procedure, that
(i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in
which the complainant has rights; and
(ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In the administrative proceeding, the complainant must prove that each of these three
elements is present.
B. EVIDENCE OF REGISTRATION AND USE IN BAD FAITH. For the purposes of Paragraph
4(a)(iii), the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the
Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad
faith:
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain name
primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name
registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a
competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your documented
out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or
service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that you
have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the
business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial
gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of
confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or
location.
C. HOW TO DEMONSTRATE YOUR RIGHTS TO AND LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN THE DOMAIN
NAME IN RESPONDING TO A COMPLAINT. When you receive a complaint, you should refer to
Paragraph 5 of the Rules of Procedure in determining how your response should be
prepared. Any of the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found
by the Panel to be proved based on its evaluation of all evidence presented, shall
demonstrate your rights or legitimate interests to the domain name for purposes of
Paragraph 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable preparations to use,
the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona
fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been commonly known by
the domain name, even if you have acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without
intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or
service mark at issue.

200.

At, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm
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II. APPENDIX B

VARIABLE
Cmwipo
Cmeres
Ldwipo
Lderes
VARIABLE
Cmnafl
Cmwipol
Cmeresl
Ldnafl
Ldwipol
Lderesl

VARIABLE
Cwipo
Ldunaf
Lduwipo

OBS

MEAN

STD.
DEV.

MIN

MAX

6907
3207
6907
3042

0.695196
0.598404
4.031995
3.981898

0.058988
0.208998
0.16402
0.230907

0.556604
0.25
3.367296
3.684704

0.78
1
4.304384
4.584968

OBS

MEAN

STD. DEV.

MIN

MAX

6801
6801
3077
6801
6801
3077

0.74789
0.692952
0.575869
3.718587
4.026402
3.983243

0.070263
0.05711
0.191426
0.14358
0.183573
0.228455

0.553846
0.556604
0.25
3.328627
3.367296
3.684704

0.9
0.78
1
4.044888
4.304384
4.584968

OBS

MEAN

STD. DEV.

MIN

MAX

6874
6907.000
6874.000

0.697
3.657
3.953

0.028
0.063
0.157

0.583
3.234
3.308

1.000
3.765
4.086
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III. APPENDIX C

Dependent
Variable
Type of
Respondent

Type of Response
Panel Decision

Variable
Duration
Unaffiliated
Licensee
Competitor
Employee
Critic
Unknown
Default
Lat Response
Transfer
Dismiss
Terminated
Name Change
Split
Judicial

Country of
Respondents
(Complainants)

ICANN Policy
Articles

RespUS (CompUS)
RespFR (CompFR)
ResAU (CompAU)
ResMX (CompMX)
ResSE (CompSE)
ResIN (CompIN)
ResCA (CompCA)
ResNZ (CompNZ)
ResGB (CompGB)
ResJP (CompJP)
ResBE (CompBE)
ResDE (CompDE)
ResIT (CompIT)
ResES (CompES)
ResNL (CompNL)
ResRU (CompRU)
ResCH (CompCH)
ResME (CompME)
ResNAC (CompNAC)
ResSA (CompSA)
ResOC (CompOC)
ResAS (CompAS)
ResEU (CompEU)
ResAF (CompAF)
Rule 4a(i)
Rule 4a(ii)
Rule 4a(iii)
Rule 4c(i)
Rule 4c(ii)
Rule 4c(iii)
Rule 4b(i)
Rule 4b(ii)
Rule 4b(iii)

VARIABLES MUELLER DATABASE
Description
Duration, in days, of each case
No relationship with the complainant
Respondent is licensee of the Complainant
Respondent is competitor
Respondent is an employee
Respondent is a critic
The status of the respondent is unknown
The respondent fails to answer to the Provider
Respondent is late in his/her response
Decision favorable to complainant
The complaint is dismissed, favorable to respondent
The complaint is terminated, without clear result (maybe there is a private agreement
or a court action)
The panel forces one of the parties to change the name of the domain.
The decision favored the complainant in some aspects and the respondent in others.
Panelists have reviewed other judicial cases from other courts in the countries of the
parties
Respondent (Complainant) from the United States
Respondent (Complainant) from the United States
Respondent (Complainant) from Australia
Respondent (Complainant) from Mexico
Respondent (Complainant) from the Switzerland
Respondent (Complainant) from India
Respondent (Complainant) from Canada
Respondent (Complainant) from New Zealand
Respondent (Complainant) from Great Britain
Respondent (Complainant) from Japan
Respondent (Complainant) from Belgium
Respondent (Complainant) from Germany
Respondent (Complainant) from Italy
Respondent (Complainant) from Spain
Respondent (Complainant) from Netherlands
Respondent (Complainant) from Russia
Respondent (Complainant) from Check Republic
Respondent (Complainant) from Middle East
Respondent (Complainant) from North America
Respondent (Complainant) from South America
Respondent (Complainant) from Oceania
Respondent (Complainant) from Asia
Respondent (Complainant) from Europe
Respondent (Complainant) from Africa
Evidence on the Articles of the ICANN policy, see appendix A.

Panelists

Variable
Panel Type
Panelist1
Panelist 19
Panelist 36
Panelist 41
Panelist 63
Panelist 64
Panelist 113
Panelist 114
Panelist 217
Panelist 180
Panelist 162
Panelist 134
Panelist 79
Panelist 27
Panelist 24

VARIABLES MUELLER DATABASE (CONTINUATION)
Description
If the panel is single member or a three member panel
Abbot, F.
Barker, L.
Buchele, J.
Carmody, J.
Donahey, M
Dorf, P.
Johnson, C.
Kalina, H.
Yachnin, R.
Samuels, J.
Page, R.
Limbury, A.
Foster, D.
Bianchi, R.
Bernstein
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IV. APPENDIX D

COX SEMI-PARAMETRIC DURATION MODEL WITHOUT STRATIFICATION
WIPO
NAF
Variables
Coefficient
Variables
Coefficient
1.234
1.355
Default
Default
(0.05748)

Split

0.556

(0.08893)

Respru

2.565

(0.12954)

Respus

0.898

(0.78246)

Compde

2.479

(0.04594)

Respse

1.703

(1.76767)

Compnac

(0.35442)

Compus

0.892

Complaw

(0.04641)

Compse

3.500
(2.02836)

1.117
(0.04553)

1.601
(0.30560)

Compin

0.693
(0.11144)

Compca

1.542
(0.26687)

Judicial

1.076
(0.04162)

Buchele, J.

3.523

Buchele, J.

(0.76310)

Carmody, J.

3.666

Carmody, J.

(0.53735)

Dorf, P.

2.640
(0.40042)

2.970
(0.313959)

2.583
(0.51499)

Johnson, C.

3.310
(0.41969)

Kalina, H.

3.068

Kalina, H.

(0.63650)

Yachnin, R.

4.829

Yachnin, R.

(1.10124)

Limbury, A.

1.756
0.690
(0.11368)

Nr Observations
Nr Failures
Time at risk
Wald Chi2(df)
Probability Chi2
Log Likelihood

1996
1996
114471
135.8
(df=12)
0.000
-12292.70

3.124
(0.417072)

(0.33117)

Bernstein

2.135
(0.38243)

1119
1119
43313
156.61
(df=7)
0.000
-6141.25

TEST OF PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS ASSUMPTION
WIPO

NAF

Default
Split
Respus
Respse
Compus
Compse
Compin
Compca
Judicial
Buchele, J.

RHO
0.038
0.014
0.001
0.017
-0.004
-0.020
0.014
-0.007
-0.007
-0.037

CHI2
2.97
0.40
0.00
0.51
0.04
0.74
0.39
0.08
0.12
2.71

PROB
0.088
0.527
0.955
0.474
0.842
0.389
0.533
0.772
0.732
0.099

Carmody, J.

-0.064

8.12

0.004

Dorf, P.
Johnson, C.
Kalina, H.
Yachnin, R.

-0.031
-0.062
-0.116
-0.101

1.96
7.64
27.17
20.41

0.161
0.006
0.000
0.000

Limbury, A.
Bernstein
GLOBAL

-0.017
0.027

0.58
1.47
68.32

0.447
0.225
0.000

ERES

RHO
-0.013
0.012
0.018
-0.006
-0.027

CHI2
0.20
0.17
0.37
0.04
0.88

PROB
0.652
0.682
0.541
0.842
0.348

Buchele,
J.
Carmody,
J.

-0.017

0.31

0.577

-0.134

19.28

0.000

Kalina, H.
Yachnin,
R.

0.016
-0.232

0.30
62.48

0.582
0.000

83.24

0.000

Default
Respru
Compde
Compnac
Complaw

CPR

RHO
0.005
-0.080
-0.015
-0.022
0.079

CHI2
0.00
1.49
0.04
0.11
1.09

PROB
0.946
0.223
0.846
0.744
0.296

Buchele,
J.
Carmody,
J.

-0.002

0.00

0.987

-0.001

0.00

0.993

Yachnin,
R.

-0.028

0.07

0.793

2.45

0.964

Default
Employee
Namecan
Respciii
Compca

Split
Ascomp
Asresp

Buchele,
J.

RHO
0.071
0.059
0.096

CHI2
0.32
0.19
0.30

PROB
0.574
0.661
0.582

0.089

0.36

0.549

0.40

TEST

TEST OF PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS ASSUMPTION, STRATIFIED MODELS

Default
Split
Respus
Respse
Compus
Compse
Compin
Compca
Judicial
Buchele, J.
Carmody, J.
Dorf, P.
Johnson, C.
Kalina, H.
Yachnin, R.
Limbury, A.
Bernstein
GLOBAL TEST

WIPO
RHO
0.032
0.025
-0.001
0.018
-0.002
-0.024
0.017
-0.005
-0.005

-0.030

-0.016
0.029

CHI2
2.10
0.73
0.00
0.65
0.01
1.49
0.48
0.04
0.04

3.19

0.69
0.98
9.06

PROB
0.147
0.394
0.948
0.419
0.937
0.222
0.488
0.839
0.839

NAF
RHO
-0.010
0.015
0.011
0.001
-0.025

CHI2
0.10
0.09
0.07
0.00
0.63

PROB
0.747
0.771
0.794
0.980
0.429

Buchele, J.
Carmody, J.

-0.009

0.11

0.743

Kalina, H.
Yachnin, R.

0.027

0.44

0.507

1.69

0.996

Default
Respru
Compde
Compnac
Complaw

0.074

0.406
0.321
0.939

93

0.983

WIPO: Cox-Snell Residuals Test of Fit

8

NAF: Cox-Snell Residuals Test of Fit

7

7

Cumulative Hazard

Cumulative Hazard
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Cox Snell Residual
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CPR: Cox-Snell Residuals Test of Fit
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6

8

eRes: Cox-Snell Test of Fit

1

1

4
Cox-Snell Residuals
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1

0
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